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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

NEW INPUT AND OUTPUT RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR
LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS
Backgounding beef cattle is an inherently risky venture.
Producers face
production risks as well as marketing risks. If a backgrounding operation is to be viable,
these risks should be addressed and effectively managed. While some effective risk
management tools are currently available to livestock producers, some other potentially
useful risk management tools, for various reasons, have been previously unavailable.
Two such tools which could help livestock producers achieve the overall goal of
managing net income risk are a program for managing feed ingredient nutrient and price
variability in the selection of minimum cost feed rations and government subsidized
livestock price insurance.
Due to lack of data and limited computational power of solvers, risk has seldom
been introduced into the feed ration selection process. Presently, both feed ingredient
nutritional data and appropriate solvers are available, allowing for risk to be fully
considered in this decision-making process. Only recently has there been policy efforts
to establish subsidized price or revenue insurance for livestock producers.
The
introduction of such insurance to livestock producers offers potential risk management
benefit but also has the potential to introduce improper incentives to livestock producers.
This study will evaluate both of the aforementioned livestock risk management
tools. In addition to evaluating their effectiveness, the policy concerns of subsidized
livestock insurance will also be addressed. Results will be relevant to a broad range of
entities. In addition to livestock producers wishing to manage the risks associated with
their operations, agribusinesses that provide service to these producers such as feed sales
or financial lending will benefit from knowing how these risk management strategies
perform. Furthermore, policy makers who will structure livestock insurance products can
hopefully do so more efficiently based on the results of the livestock insurance analysis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Beef production continues to be a major component of United States agriculture.
According the 1997 Census of Agriculture, market value of all cattle and calves1
produced comprised slightly more than 20% of the total market value of all United States
agricultural production. Fed cattle (referred to as fattened cattle in 1997 census reports),
or beef cattle fed specifically for slaughter, comprised about 10% of this total. Given this
level of contribution to the national agricultural economy, it is worthwhile to focus some
agricultural economic analysis on beef production. One broad objective of such analysis
should be searching for ways to improve the viability and profitability of beef operations.
As with all types of agriculture, ability to manage the risk associated with a beef
operation is paramount to the success of that operation.

Unlike pork and poultry

production, beef production has seen relatively little effort at vertical coordination
through non-price means and thus cannot enjoy the risk sharing opportunities these
provide. Beef producers, in general, focus on a specific phase of production (e.g. cowcalf production or cattle feeding) and must take full responsibility for managing the risks
associated with that particular type of operation. Given this situation, two important roles
of livestock economists are the evaluation of existing risk management strategies for beef
producers and the identification and evaluation of novel risk management strategies.
This study will focus on the latter by introducing and evaluating two novel

1

The census category of cattle and calves will encompass beef cattle and calves sold as well as those sold
for dairy or other purposes.

1

livestock risk management strategies.

The analyses of this study will apply these

strategies to beef production operations but the general framework for the strategies as
well as conclusions from the evaluations should apply to a broader group of livestock
producers.
Before introducing these strategies, it will be beneficial to first provide basic
background information on beef production, followed by a brief overview of current risk
management strategies available to beef producers.

Then a review of selected risk

literature will be used to establish the theoretical and methodological framework needed
to evaluate the risk management strategies.

After the strategies are introduced and

evaluated, conclusions regarding this evaluation will be presented.

Beef Backgrounding
Beef cattle production takes place at three basic levels: cow-calf production,
backgrounding, and finishing. Cow-calf producers own breeding stock and produce beef
calves. These calves are usually weaned at about 400 to 600 pounds, depending upon
breed effects and in which region of the United States they are raised. At this point the
calves may be sent directly to the feedlot or they may enter a backgrounding program.
Calves in a backgrounding program are fed until they reach weights of about 750 pounds.
This weight gain can be accomplished through grazing programs (e.g., grazing cool
season pasture in the southeastern U.S. or grazing winter wheat in the southern plains),
feeding programs that rely on harvested forages and feed concentrates, or some
combination thereof.

At this weight the cattle are known as feeder cattle and are

generally shipped to a feedlot where they enter intensive feeding programs until they
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reach slaughter weight. There are risks and production conditions that are unique to each
stage of production.

Given these differences, it is often beneficial to focus livestock

studies on a specific level of production.

Backgrounding as defined above is a very

common practice in the southeastern United States.

This study will focus on the risks

associated with these types of backgrounding opertations.
The profitability of backgrouding operations is influenced by risk from several
different sources including production and marketing risk.

Mortality and morbidity (i.e.,

reduced physical response due to illness) are two of the most common production risks
that affect animal performance. These are often attributable, at least in some degree, to
weather and environmental conditions, which can also influence performance directly.
Another form of backgrounding production risk is uncertain feed ingredient composition.
Specifically, if feedstuffs do not contain the expected amount of nutrients, animals will
not achieve expected levels of weight gain. In addition to production risk, backgrounders
face marketing risk.

This is true of both inputs and outputs.

Since feed and weaned

calves are the two major inputs for a backgrounding operation, any fluctuation in their
prices can drastically affect profitability.

Backgrounders must purchase these inputs

months in advance of the sale of feeder cattle.

Therefore, volatility of feeder cattle

(output) prices is also vital to backgrounders’ profitability.
This study will focus on the marketing risk associated with backgrounding and the
production risk of uncertain feed composition. Specifically this study will examine novel
risk management strategies for price and composition risks associated with purchasing
feed ingredients and marketing risk of selling feeder cattle.
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Before introducing these

strategies a brief explanation of commonly used strategies for managing input and output
risks will be presented.

Current Livestock Risk Management
Producers wishing to manage marketing risk often utilize futures markets to do
so.

Many of the feed ingredients purchased by backgrounders have corresponding

futures contracts that are traded on futures exchanges. Producers can hedge the purchase
of these inputs to attempt to “lock in” a price subject to basis risk or they can purchase
call options to establish a price ceiling for the ingredients. For feedstuffs such as grain
by-products (which represent an important feed resource for many commercial
backgrounding operations) there are no exact futures contracts.

Producers can possibly

hedge these using a closely related futures contract (Anderson and Danthine). However,
this procedure, known as cross hedging, can be quite complicated.

A more common

approach, which is also used for traditional ingredients, is forward contracting.

A

producer can contract the purchase of feedstuffs in advance of the actual purchase
thereby reducing price risk of the feed inputs.
Feeder cattle price risk can be managed using the same mechanisms.

The

Chicago Mercantile Exchange trades a feeder cattle futures contract. Just as with feed
ingredients, producers may choose to hedge or cross hedge the sale of feeder cattle using
this contract. Producers can also establish a price floor by purchasing a put option. If
prices are favorable, it may be beneficial to contract the sale of feeder cattle in advance.
As with inputs, forward contracting establishes a price in advance and reduces marketing
risk of the output.
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Another form of input risk that has received considerably less attention in risk
management studies is input composition uncertainty.

In the context of livestock

production this is variability of nutrients in a given feed ingredient.

Generally producers

assume that nutrient levels are constant in feed ingredients from one purchase to the next.
If, in reality, nutrient levels are lower than assumed, the nutritional requirements of the
animals may not be met and therefore there will be fewer pounds of feeder cattle to sell at
the end of a feeding period.

This form of risk to livestock operations has been

documented in animal science literature and briefly addressed in economic studies.
However, it has yet to be modeled explicitly. Furthermore, it has yet to be incorporated
into risk management strategies for livestock producers.
While livestock producers have alternatives for managing both input and output
risk, it is worthwhile to continue to seek out and evaluate new alternatives. This study
does just that.

Risk management tools that have been, for all practical purposes,

previously unavailable to producers are introduced and evaluated.

These risk

management strategies are discussed in the following section.

Novel Risk Management Tools
Managing Input Risk
Producers can choose a minimum cost combination of feed ingredients that satisfy
the nutritional requirements of the animals from available feed ingredients using
mathematical programming. This is a common approach in both academic research and
applied decision tools.

However, it is also possible to use this selection process to

manage both the price and composition risk associated with feed ingredients.
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This risk

management strategy has gone largely ignored in agricultural economic research.
Chapter III will specify and evaluate such a strategy by expanding the basic minimum
cost feed ration model to consider both feed ingredient price and composition risk.

Managing Output Risk
Recent legislation has cleared the way for government subsidized livestock
insurance. The Risk Management Agency of the USDA is currently evaluating livestock
insurance products to be used in pilot programs around the country. These products will
likely be sold by private firms in a form similar to European put options with premiums
being subsidized by the government. The introduction of new risk management tool such
as this could have major implications for beef production. Chapter IV of this study will
simulate the effects of subsidized insurance on expected feeder cattle prices.
management ability of this insurance will then be evaluated.

The risk

This chapter will also

examine the policy implications of subsidized livestock insurance and form hypotheses of
the potential effects on beef production of such a program.

Study Objectives and Contributions
The general objective of this study is to introduce and evaluate novel risk
management strategies for livestock producers.
evaluated.

Specifically, two novel strategies will be

These are the consideration of risk in the selection of feed rations and

government subsidized livestock insurance.
Chapter III introduces the consideration of feed ingredient price and nutrient risk
into the feed ration selection process. This expanded model will be an improvement over
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previous ration selection models and decision aids that have largely ignored nutrient and
price variability of feed ingredients.

Economic studies have shown that these risks do

influence variability of total feed cost and animal performance and therefore net income
(e.g., Prevatt et al. highlight feedstuff price variability; Thomas et al. examine feedstuff
nutrient variability).

In addition to economic studies, recent animal science and nutrition

studies have focused on nutrient variability in feedstuffs (Cromwell et al., DePeters et
al.). The presence of these issues in such scientific studies justifies their being modeled
explicitly in the context of an optimal feed ration selection process.
Recent feedstuff data availability and improvements in the computational power
of optimization software makes the specification and modeling of an expanded model
possible.

Such a model will give producers the opportunity to manage risks associated

with selecting a feed ration. In addition to providing information on the effectiveness of
this risk management strategy, Chapter III will make both academic and applied
contributions.

The study will serve as one of the few examples of modeling technical

coefficient risk utilizing Merrill’s approach.

Merrill developed this modeling technique

nearly forty years ago but due to limitations of computational solvers it has gone virtually
unused. The model presented in Chapter III will also serve as one of the only examples
of a feed ration selection model that considers both price and nutrient risk involved in the
feed ration process. This model should serve as a basis for more advanced decision tools
for producers wishing to manage these risks.
Chapter IV evaluates the effectiveness of subsidized livestock price insurance
compared to European put options.

This chapter highlights the adoption of both

European options and subsidized insurance over a wide range of risk attitudes.
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This

allows for effectiveness of these alternatives as risk management tools to be evaluated.
Furthermore, willingness to pay for unsubsidized and subsidized risk management
programs will be calculated.

This information coupled with economic theory provides

the basis needed to form hypotheses concerning the effects of subsidized livestock
insurance.

Specifically, the hypotheses will focus on unintentional effects of these

programs on beef production.

The formation and presentation of these hypotheses will

make the results of the study relevant to a wide range of individuals.
In a broad sense, Chapter IV will serve as an example of the effects of risk on
agricultural decision making.

Specifically, the results will be of interest to livestock

producers, who will soon need to evaluate the usefulness of similar insurance products to
their respective operations. Such producers can look to these results for an example of
how these products may affect their operations. The results from Chapter IV will also be
of interest to policy makers who will soon be called upon to construct livestock insurance
products.

The hypotheses offered in Chapter IV should serve to highlight the concerns

and possible dangers of constructing such risk management programs.

Organization of the Study
This study is structured around two central articles (Chapters III and IV).

This

may differ from previous theses or dissertations encountered by the reader and therefore a
brief description of the organization of the study is warranted. Both Chapters III and IV
are stand alone articles and can be reviewed independently of each other and all other
portions of this thesis. However, the two articles are related by overlapping objectives,
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methodologies, and subject matter.

Given these overlaps, there is some benefit to

presenting the two articles as parts of a larger livestock risk management study.
An introduction to this study has been presented in the preceding sections of this
chapter.

The review of selected literature in the following section describes related

previous research and lays the foundations for the methodologies used Chapters III and
IV. Much of the information in Chapters I and II will be repeated with more or less detail
within Chapters III and IV. This is a necessary condition if both Chapters III and IV are
to be stand-alone articles. This repetition should not detract from the study but rather will
serve to reinforce those concepts that are core to the study.

There will be similar

repetition in Chapter V where a brief summary of the study will be presented.
Conclusions from the study will follow this summary.

9

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF SELECTED RISK LITERATURE

As outlined in the previous chapter, backgrounding beef cattle is a risky venture.
Backgrounders face production and marketing risk.

While production risks and their

effects on animal performance can be controlled to some extent by sound management
practices, they can by no means be eliminated. There are also a considerable number of
agricultural economic studies that refer to the riskiness of feeder cattle prices (e.g.,
Johnson, Spreen, and Hewitt; Harrison et al.).

Given this situation, examination of risk

management and decision-making criteria for backgrounders is warranted. This chapter,
will present a review of some widely accepted methods of examining risky decision
making that can be applied to virtually any situation wherein a decision maker must
choose between alternatives with risky outcomes.

The following two chapters of this

study will then apply some of these methods to the specific case of a beef backgrounder.

Choice Under Uncertainty
One of the most widely researched areas in economics is how individuals make
decisions and evaluate available alternatives.

This analysis is made much more

interesting, realistic and complex when risk surrounding the alternatives is considered. In
this section, a brief history of risky decision making will be presented.

The generally

accepted decision-making model of maximizing expected utility will be outlined along
with some of its strengths and limitations.

After this, alternative decision-making criteria

will be given a more thorough review to establish the relevance of their use in the
economic analyses of the following two chapters.
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Expected Utility Framework
Nearly three hundred years ago Bernoulli proposed that individuals do not base
risky decisions solely on the expected value of outcomes but rather on the utility
(Bernoulli used the term “moral value”) that they expect to receive from the outcomes.
Since this time, economists, mathematicians and scientists from many other disciplines
have endeavored to fully define the decision-making process when outcomes are
uncertain. von Neuman and Morgenstern offer what is perhaps the most widely accepted
model for choice facing uncertainty in their expected utility hypothesis.
Under the expected utility hypothesis, von Neuman and Morgenstern begin by
stating that utility maximization is a rational goal when a decision maker is faced with
risky choices.

In this framework, an individual will evaluate the expected value and

probability of occurrence of each alternative.

This evaluation is carried out by first

entering the probabilities and expected outcomes into an individual’s utility function.

It

is then a matter of selecting the combination of available alternatives that maximizes the
function.

The manner in which individuals choose among available alternatives is then

dependent upon their utility function, which reflects attitude toward risk.

Attitude Toward Risk
Some individuals, known as risk preferring or risk seeking, will seek out risky
situations in hopes of realizing large payoffs at times.

Others will only consider the

expected values and give no consideration to the risk surrounding them.

These

individuals are commonly referred to as being risk neutral. A third possibility, and some
would say the most common case, is an individual who avoids risk. This class of risk
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averse decision makers actually maximize utility by reducing the variability surrounding
the expected value of an outcome. Risk aversion has been the subject of many economic
studies and can actually be quantified and used to show how much an individual is
willing to pay to manage the risk associated with available choices. A classic example of
this is calculating a risk premium or the amount an individual is willing to pay to avoid
risk in a given situation.
Risk averse decision makers will seek to manage the risk associated with their
alternatives. Risk averse individuals, in many cases, are willing to forgo some amount of
expected income (a risk premium) to avoid entering into a risky situation (Arrow, Pratt).
This risk attitude is the fundamental basis for risk sharing instruments such as insurance.
If a decision maker’s utility function is known, the risk premium that he or she will pay to
avoid a risky situation can be quantified and used to arrive at willingness to pay for
insurance (Pratt).
While both expected utility hypothesis and Pratt’s method for calculating risk
aversion are theoretically sound, each assumes that the utility function of the decision
maker is known and specified. It is possible to specify utility functions using a properly
designed set of interview questions (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker) and there are
several economic analyses that use this approach (e.g., Officer and Halter; Lin, Dean, and
Moore).

While results from some studies have been promising, there are many factors

ranging from type of questions asked (Roumasset, Young) to assumptions regarding
functional forms (Lin and Chang) that can bias the specification of utility functions.
Furthermore, even if properly implemented, eliciting utility functions is time consuming
and arduous.

In response to these limitations of the expected utility hypothesis,
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alternative decision-making criteria have been developed that do not require that utility
functions be known.

This study will rely on such methodologies in the interest of

circumventing the problems associated with specifying decision makers’ utility functions.

Decision-Making Tools When Utility Functions are Unknown
It is neither practical nor, in some cases, even possible to specify a decision
maker’s utility function.

Therefore applied economic decision-making analysis must

often rely on alternative procedures of ranking risky alternatives.

In general these

approaches are designed to present a risk efficient set of choices, which is a subset of all
available choices, and allow decision makers to choose from them. Any alternative not in
the risk efficient set is said to be risk dominated and should not be considered by the
decision maker.

Two widely used techniques that follow this general framework are

expected value variance (E-V) analysis and stochastic dominance criteria.

Expected Value Variance Analysis
Intrigued by the manner in which investors choose stocks in which to invest,
Markowitz sought to explain how individuals choose an optimal investment mix from
available risky stocks.

Confronted with the problems mentioned earlier associated with

specifying utility functions, Markowitz developed a procedure that requires only a
measure of risk aversion to simulate utility maximizing decisions.

Freund made similar

contributions, apparently independent of Markowitz, to the development of a technique
known as expected value variance (E-V) analysis.
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E-V is widely used in agricultural economic research to model risky decision
making. There has been some debate, however, as to whether E-V results are consistent
with expected utility hypothesis results.

It is now generally agreed upon that E-V

analysis is consistent with expected utility theory in three cases:

(1) the underlying

income distribution is normal (Freund), (2) the distributions of the decision variable
differ only by location and scale (Meyer, 1987), and (3) the underlying utility function is
quadratic (Markowitz, Tobin).

Given its presence in many economic studies and

empirical evidence that demonstrates its closeness to expected utility maximizing choices
(Levy and Markowitz), E-V analysis is a useful tool for evaluating risky decisions.
In addition to being used in optimization procedures such as Markowitz’s
investment problem (use of E-V in optimization will be addressed in detail in a following
section), E-V can be used as a means of simply ranking mutually exclusive, available
risky alternatives (Robison and Barry; Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).

The E-V

framework calculates the risk-adjusted returns or certainty equivalent (CE) for each
alternative.

The CE is the expected value of an alternative minus the variance

surrounding the expected value times a risk aversion parameter.

The CE of each

alternative can be used to rank the alternatives (Robison and Barry).

Stochastic Dominance Criteria
Unlike E-V analysis, which is based solely on the first two moments of a
distribution, stochastic dominance (SD) criteria consider the entire distribution and
therefore are generally more robust analytical tools. This is because SD places fewer
restrictions on the utility function of the decision maker and bases risk dominance on the

14

entire cumulative distribution function (CDF) of each alternative.
stochastic dominance are used to rank risky choices.

Three types of

These are first degree stochastic

dominance (FSD), second degree stochastic dominance (SSD), and stochastic dominance
with respect to a function or generalized stochastic dominance (SDRF).
The least restrictive form of SD is FSD and only imposes the restriction that a
decision maker prefers more to less. Consider the CDF’s of two income (y) generating
alternatives, A and B, represented by A(y) and B(y), respectively.

Alternative A

dominates B in the sense of FSD if for all values of y A(y) ≤ B(y) with at least one strict
inequality. In other words, the CDF of A lies to the right of the CDF of B indicating that
for any given probability a higher income level is associated with A than with B
(Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson). FSD does have limitations. If the CDF’s of available
alternatives cross then there is no dominance in the sense of FSD.
common when evaluating several similar decisions.

This occurrence is

So when faced with many

alternatives FSD is not likely to eliminate a large portion of them, thereby leaving the
decision maker with a large number of alternatives still in the efficient set (Robison and
Barry).

To gain more discriminatory power, it is necessary to add more restrictions to

FSD.
SSD assumes not only that more is preferred to less but that decision makers are
risk averse for all values of y. This allows CDF’s that cross to be evaluated in many
cases. Using the same notation as in the FSD example, A dominates B in the sense of
SSD if
y

∫ [A(y) - B(y)] dy ≤ 0

+∞
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for all values of y with at least one strict inequality (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).
Put into words, SSD compares the areas between the two CDF’s. If the area between
A(y) and B(y) where A(y) ≤ B(y) (Area X) is greater than the area between A(y) and
B(y) where B(y) ≤ A(y) (Area Y) then A is dominant to B in the sense of SDD.
However, if Areas X and Y are equal or if Area Y > Area X then SSD cannot discern
between the two.

Given this limitation of discriminatory power and the assumptions

already in place it is very useful to have more robust SD criteria.
Meyer 1977 specifies SDRF, which is a more discriminatory and flexible test for
risk dominance. SDRF is the most discriminatory of the SD criteria (Robison and Barry;
Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson). Also, FSD and SSD can be shown to be special cases
of SDRF (see Meyer for explanation). These characteristics of SDRF make it the most
robust and useful tool for risk analysis.
SDRF attempts to introduce the advantages of knowing decision makers
preferences without eliciting utility functions.

This is accomplished by relying on the

specification of upper (Φ U) and lower (Φ L) bounds of the Pratt risk aversion coefficient,
which is often easier to estimate than a utility function (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).
Assuming an individual has a utility function U(y), then the Pratt coefficient is equal to
− U' ' (y)
.
U' (y)

(2.1)

Once L and U have been specified then a U(y) that minimizes
(2.2)
is found. If the expression is

ΦU

∫Φ [B(y) - A(y) ]U ' ( y ) dy
L

positive then A is preferred to B. If the expression is

zero, SDRF cannot rank the two alternatives. If the expression is negative, B might be
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preferred to A.

To verify this A(y) – B(y) is substituted into the brackets and the

expression is reevaluated.

If the minimum of the new expression is positive then B is

definitely preferred to A.

If the expression is again negative, SDRF cannot rank the

alternatives.
Since SDRF is such a robust and powerful SD criteria, decision tools that utilize
this approach have been developed. One such tool is the software developed by Raskin
and Cochran, of which a thorough explanation is given by Goh et al. This software has
been used in numerous agricultural economic risk analyses. For example Williams et al.
use the program to evaluate crop insurance policies while Harrison et al. use it to rank
feeder cattle marketing strategies.

Calculating Risk Preferences
Both E-V and SDRF require that risk aversion parameters be numerically
specified.

Once again the issue of the decision maker’s utility function being unknown

becomes relevant.

Much the same as the decision-making criteria reviewed earlier,

methods for calculating risk aversion parameters when utility functions are unknown
have been developed. McCarl and Bessler offer such a method for estimating the upper
bound of the Pratt risk aversion coefficient.
McCarl and Bessler propose a formulation in which the decision maker is said to
maximize the lower limit of a confidence interval from a normally distributed set of
returns. The formula is
(2.3)

Φ = 2Z

α

Sy
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where Φ= risk aversion parameter, Zα= the standardized normal one-tailed Z value of an
α level of significance, and Sy is the relevant standard deviation under risk neutral
returns. In this formulation, Zα = 50% is considered to be risk neutral while Zα greater
than 50% is risk averse and Zα less than 50% is risk preferring.

This technique of

estimating the Pratt risk aversion coefficient is applicable to E-V and SDRF analysis, as
well as any procedure where a measure of risk aversion is required.

Risk in Mathematical Programming Models
While ranking available alternative choices is useful in decision analysis it is
often beneficial to identify optimal combinations of alternatives.2

Mathematical

programming has been used extensively, especially in farm management and production
economic studies, to do just that (e.g., Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker; Beneke and
Winterboer).

Linear programming, a specific form of mathematical programming, is

commonly used to model decision making as a constrained optimization. A limitation of
basic linear programming models is the absence of risk or uncertainty from the modeling.
There are techniques available that introduce risk into the optimization procedure.
Some of these techniques require nonlinear specification of either the objective function
or constraints and thus have only become feasible as the computational power of solvers
has increased.

A description of introducing risk into mathematical programming models

follows with more explanation being given to those techniques utilized in this study.

2

Convex stochastic dominance (CSD) as developed by Fishburn can also be used to arrive at linear
combinations of alternatives. As it is not utilized in this study, CSD was not explained in detail.
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Objective Function Risk
Many

mathematical

programming

models,

such

as

Markowitz’s

portfolio

selection model, must choose an optimal combination of alternatives from a group of
available, risky alternatives. If only the expected value or mean return of each alternative
is used to make this selection, the variability surrounding the expected value is ignored
and the variability of the objective function value is also ignored.

As Bernoulli

hypothesized long ago and Markowitz observed in the stock market, decision makers do
not make decisions solely on this expected value. One method of introducing the concept
of objective function risk into mathematical programming models is an E-V framework.
E-V analysis (Markowitz, Freund), described in some detail in the previous
section, considers the variance of the objective function value by considering the variance
and covariance of the objective function contributions of the decision variables.
Specifically, the expected objective function value is penalized by a risk aversion
coefficient times the variance around the expected objective function value.

This forces

the optimization to consider objective function risk with the goal of simulating utility
maximizing decision making.

Numerous agricultural economic studies have utilized E-V

analysis in a mathematical programming framework. For example, Boisvert and McCarl
list many publications, too numerous to mention here.
One concern associated with E-V formulation is that it results in a quadratic
objective function.

Previously this has been a concern to some researchers given the

complexity of a nonlinear model and the limitation of computational solvers.

As a

response to this problem Hazell developed the MOTAD (Minimization of Total Absolute
Deviations), which linearly approximates E-V results based on total absolute deviations.
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However, a nonlinear objective function is not ordinarily a problem to modern solvers.
McCarl and Onal state that it is generally more efficient to allow solvers to deal with
nonlinear objective functions than to perform a linear transformation. Since such solvers
have been available it has been less necessary to rely on Hazell’s MOTAD formulation.
An additional concern that has been raised is that the assumption of a quadratic
utility function is quite restrictive.

If this assumption is imposed it implies that absolute

risk aversion increases with the level of payoff (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).

In

response to this issue, Lambert and McCarl introduced DEMP (Direct Expected
Maximizing Nonlinear Programming).

This technique is less restrictive in regard to form

of the objective function but requires that the utility of wealth function be specified.
While utilized to some degree DEMP is not as widely accepted as E-V analysis to model
objective function risk.
Two other techniques that consider objective function risk are Safety First (Roy)
and Target MOTAD (Tauer).

Safety First assumes that first and foremost a decision

maker will make decisions such that some objective function value threshold is met.
Similarly Target MOTAD considers a target income level and maximum allowable
shortfall from this target.

While useful to some degree these techniques are not as

powerful or robust as E-V analysis, given that they do not consider the total variance of
objective function contribution and objective function value.
observable in the economic literature as E-V analysis.
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Therefore, neither is as

Technical Coefficient Risk
There can also be risk involved in the technical coefficients of inputs.

That is,

variability in the decision variables contributions toward the fulfillment of model
constraints.

This form of risk has a less pronounced presence in economic studies

relative to objective function risk but some approaches are available.
Merrill offers an approach that is very similar to E-V analysis, both technically
and intuitively.

Merrill suggests that a given constraint can be made more binding by

adding a penalty term consisting of a risk aversion parameter times either the variance or
standard deviation around the expected contributions of decision variables to that
constraint.

This approach introduces nonlinearity into the constraints of mathematical

programming model.

This has historically been more troublesome to deal with than

objective function nonlinearity.

Wicks and Guise offer an alternative formulation that

linearly approximates the variance or standard deviation of technical coefficients.

They

utilize a MOTAD approach to arrive at total deviations. The measure of total deviations
is then transformed into the estimated standard deviation using a variant of the Fisher
constant.
While the Wicks and Guise approximation was warranted at one time, solvers are
now powerful enough to deal with nonlinear constraints directly in some cases. McCarl
and Onal cite General Algebraic Modeling Systems (GAMS) MINOS algorithm as an
example of one such solver.

Furthermore, this study will demonstrate that this

nonlinearity can be modeled directly without unreasonable complications and that
Merrill’s approach can be feasible.
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Right Hand Side Risk
The final form of risk that is sometimes modeled in mathematical programming is
right hand side (RHS) or available resource variability.

Cocks offers discreet stochasitc

programming as one technique for modeling RHS risk.

While utilized to some degree,

models often become cumbersome if numerous random variables are present.
Researchers wishing to avoid this potential modeling difficulty often use Chance
Constrained Programming.

McCarl and Spreen state that Chance Constrained

Programming is one of the most commonly used techniques of modeling RHS risk.
Charnes and Cooper introduced this technique to deal with RHS uncertainty. The major
requirement is that the decision maker be able to decide the frequency with which a
constraint must be satisfied.

Given this information and the probability distributions of

the RHS, risk associated RHS limits can be modeled.

Study Application of Risk Analysis
The tools presented in this chapter can be used to model many forms of risk in
agricultural decision making.

The following two chapters evaluate specific cases relying

upon some of these tools. Chapter III will introduce E-V analysis and Merrill’s approach
into a minimum cost feed ration linear programming model to account for price and
nutrient variability, respectively.

Chapter IV will utilize E-V and SDRF as means of

evaluating government subsidized livestock insurance and comparing it to current risk
management strategies.
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CHAPTER III
DETERMINING OPTIMAL RATIONS CONSIDERING FEED INGREDIENT
NUTRIENT AND PRICE RISK

Introduction
The large amount of agricultural economic literature that addresses uncertainty in
production agriculture indicates the importance of the ability of agricultural decision
makers to manage risk (e.g., Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker; Boisvert and McCarl; and
Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson; Robison and Barry).

Livestock producers are no

exception and must make production decisions, such as input selection, in an uncertain
environment. Feed is arguably the most important input, next to the actual animals, for a
livestock operation in terms of impact on total expenses. This is evident in 1999 National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) data for all livestock farms in the United States.
NASS reports that expenditures on feed in 1999 comprised 26.1% of total farm
expenditures, representing the single greatest farm expense.

Given this importance of

feed to livestock operations, the selection of minimum cost feed rations using linear
programming has, historically, been given considerable attention in agricultural economic
research. However, the consideration of the risks associated with feed ration selection in
the agricultural economic literature has been very limited.
Traditional linear programming minimum cost feed ration models are solved with
the assumptions that all feed ingredient prices (objective function contributions) and
nutrient levels (technical coefficients) are known with certainty.

These models are

available to producers in the form of decision-making tools that formulate minimum cost
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rations subject to nutritional constraints. Once a producer chooses a ration for a typical
backgrounding program, he or she will generally prefer to feed the same ration to a group
of animals for the entire time that they are on feed.

Depending on the size of the

operation and its feed storage capacity, this will usually require multiple purchases of the
feed ingredients during the feeding period.

Therefore, if a ration is chosen by a model

imposing the above assumptions, the producer is fully exposed to variability in the
nutritional composition of feedstuffs from one purchase to the next. Furthermore, in the
absence of any forward contracting or hedging activity, the producer is also vulnerable to
fluctuations in feed ingredient prices. This ration will not be optimal to the producer if he
or she is risk averse regarding nutrient variability, price fluctuation, or both.

In past

research, it has been necessary to impose the assumptions of certain prices and ingredient
composition due to the limited computational power of solvers and the limited data on the
variability of the nutritional composition of feedstuffs.

The ability of modern solvers to

deal with nonlinearity and more complex models in general coupled with the availability
of more complete feed ingredient nutritional data from the National Research Council
(NRC) now make it possible to employ relatively unused mathematical programming
techniques and avoid imposing either of these restrictive assumptions.
A mathematical programming model that determines optimal feed rations by
considering both feed ingredient nutrient and price variability can be achieved by
relaxing both the assumption that technical coefficients are known with certainty and that
objective function contributions are constant. Merrill offers an approach for dealing with
technical coefficient uncertainty.

Despite its intuitiveness, limitations of optimization

solvers have prevented the utilization of this technique in any formal agricultural
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economic literature since its conceptualization.

The recent availability of the

aforementioned NRC feed ingredient nutrient variability data coupled with the need to
address feed ingredient nutrient variability make it possible and worthwhile to utilize this
technique in the ration selection process.

Essentially, Merrill’s approach allows the

probability of satisfying constraints (e.g., nutritional constraints) to be increased subject
to a decision maker’s aversion to technical coefficient risk.

In the case of feed ration

selection, this will result in a greater ability to accurately predict animal weight gain and
total days on feed. The assumption that objective function contributions are constant can
be relaxed using expected value variance (E-V) analysis.

E-V is a technique that is

widely used to model uncertainty of objective function contributions in agriculture and
allows decision makers to choose alternatives with a more a predictable net income or in
the case of a feed ration model, a more predictable total ration cost. Greater ability to
predict total days on feed and ration cost results in greater ability to predict total feed
cost. This enhanced ability to predict total feed cost results in a less variable net income
and can be accomplished by expanding the traditional minimum cost feed ration model
using the aforementioned modeling techniques.
This study will introduce these two components into the economic analysis of
feed ration selection.

This will result in a more comprehensive mathematical

programming model that incorporates consideration of both nutrient and price variability
into the ration selection process.

Rations chosen with these considerations would be

optimal to a decision maker subject to his or her level of aversion to each type of risk. In
addition to this practical application, this study will make other worthwhile contributions.
It will be one of the only applications of Merrill’s technique, since its development, to
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deal with technical coefficient uncertainty, which is generally difficult to address in any
mathematical programming model.

Furthermore, introduction of the NRC feed

ingredient nutrient variability data will represent one of the first uses of this data in
economic research.
The general objective of this study is to provide insight into how livestock and
dairy producers can manage risks associated with selecting a feed ration. Specifically,
this study analyzes how the consideration of feed ingredient price risk and nutrient
variability affects the composition of optimal beef backgrounding3 rations. In addition to
making the aforementioned contributions, information resulting from this study will serve
as a starting point for more advanced decision-making tools for large-scale livestock
producers such as feedlots and dairies.

Specifically, tools can be designed to consider

managing price risk and nutrient variability of feed ingredients and selecting feed rations
that are optimal to individual producers.
Literature associated with minimum cost feed rations, E-V analysis, and technical
coefficient uncertainty will be presented and discussed to establish the theoretical
framework of input selection facing uncertainty and to develop a methodology that
specifically addresses feed ingredient price and composition risk.

The economic model

incorporating nutrient and price risk management will be defined.

Finally, the results of

this model will be presented for analysis and discussion with conclusions following.

3

Backgrounding, as referred to throughout this paper, indicates producers who buy weaned calves
weighing approximately 500 pounds to be sold at approximately 750 pounds. The 250-pound gain is
achieved through a 4 to 5 month feeding program that utilizes both hay and feed concentrates.
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Background
In basic production theory, prior to development of any risk analysis framework, a
producer would know, with certainty, the prices and compositions of all inputs. In this
scenario the minimum cost combination of feed ingredients to achieve a target level of
average daily gain could be found by plotting the isoquant that represents all possible
combinations of feedstuffs that would achieve this gain and subsequently finding the
tangency with an isocost line.

Since attributes of the inputs are deterministic, this point

would also represent the optimal combination of feed ingredients that meet the nutritional
requirements. In the real world, this is obviously not the case. Neither input prices nor
the technical aspects of inputs (i.e., production effects) are known with certainty. These
uncertainties will affect producers differently, depending on their attitude toward price
risk. There have been adjustments to economic analysis to reflect these responses to risk.
One economic analytical tool that identifies optimal input combinations from feasible
inputs is mathematical programming.

Mathematical programming has also become more

flexible to deal with these uncertainties that are present in the real world of agricultural
decision making.
The use of linear programming models that impose the above assumptions to
select minimum cost feed rations has a long and well-established history.

Stigler

considered the minimum cost diets that exactly meet the nutrient requirements for human
subsistence in one of the earliest examples prior to the full development of linear
programming.

However, the basic concept of satisfying a set of nutritional constraints

while minimizing the cost of the diet is evident in Stigler’s work.

Traditional minimum

cost feed ration models are set up in this very way and this basic formulation can be
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modified to balance any type of ration for which these constraints are known (McCarl
and Spreen).
Waugh was among the first to apply this model formulation to the selection of
minimum cost livestock feed rations. Specifically, Waugh laid out a procedure using the
then novel linear programming to formulate minimum cost dairy rations, noting that if all
prices and nutritional compositions of feeds are known and properly specified then the
resulting ration is indeed the minimum cost feasible ration. McCarl and Spreen state that,
after Waugh’s efforts, the determination of minimum cost feed rations for livestock has
been one of the most common uses of linear programming (see Ashour et al.; Beneke and
Winterboer; and

Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow for discussion and examples).

In

addition to a pronounced presence in academic literature of the basic minimum cost feed
ration methodology, there is also plethora of software packages designed for applied use
by producers (e.g, Taurus from The University of California at Davis).
While consideration of risk in studies focusing on minimum cost feed rations for
livestock and dairy production is not prevalent, some examples exist. Thomas et al. offer
an analysis of minimum cost dairy rations. Their study focused on the fact that the cost
of relevant nutrients are not constant, even though traditional minimum cost feed ration
models treat them as such. Thomas et al. address this issue by estimating the cost of net
energy for lactation (NEl), total digestible nutrients (TDN), and crude protein (CP) based
on low, medium, and high prices of corn (a very common energy component of dairy
rations).

They go on to show that using constant nutrient cost generally underestimates

the cost of the ration. Other studies examining nutrient variability include Chen as well as
Rahman and Bender.

Each of these studies provides an analysis based on a target
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probability for a constraint. Chen focuses on the protein requirement. In this formulation
only protein variability is considered and an iterative modeling procedure is used. Chen
provides an example of formulating minimum cost poultry rations and shows that as the
target probability of meeting protein requirement increases so does ration cost.

While

this technique was appropriate at the time, modern solvers now allow for more efficient
and exact modeling.
Prevatt et al. offer an analysis of the feasibility of backgrounding and finishing
cattle in Florida.

Minimum cost feed rations for backgrounding and finishing were

determined based on available local and imported feeds.

The study found that the

variation of feed costs over time drastically affected the variability of net returns to
hypothetical backgrounding and finishing operations in Florida.

Using several levels of

required net returns to management along with required rates of return associated with
the risk of the returns, Prevatt et al. concluded that acceptance of beef backgrounding and
finishing operations would depend upon individual risk preferences.

The study also

confirmed that this risk associated with the livestock operations was due, in no small part,
to variation over time of feed ingredient prices. While both Thomas et al. and Prevatt et
al. highlighted the effects of risk on the traditional approach to choosing minimum cost
feed rations, no attempt was made to implement different modeling techniques.

This

study will implement Merrill’s technique for modeling technical coefficient variability
and an E-V framework to address both nutrient variability and price risk, respectively.
Relative to management of objective function risk, the consideration of technical
coefficients uncertainty has a considerably less pronounced presence in the economic
literature.

Merrill offers one method for dealing with technical coefficient risk in which
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the standard deviation (or variance) of the technical coefficient values are used to
calculate the total standard deviation (or variance) of the constraint value based upon
which decision variables enter the optimal solution. This standard deviation (or variance)
is multiplied by a risk aversion parameter. The product of the two make up a penalty
term that effectively makes the constraint more binding as the standard deviation of the
technical coefficient value increases.
nonlinear.

Constraints modified with this approach are

Due to the complexities associated with nonlinear constraints this modeling

technique has gone relatively unused.
Despite its intuitiveness, the modeling concerns have all but prevented use of
Merrill’s technique.

However, Wicks and Guise do offer a linear approximation of

Merrill’s approach.

While this approach is a variation of Merrill’s technique, it

represents the most similar technique present in economic literature.
worthwhile to briefly review the Wicks and Guise study.

Therefore it is

Wicks and Guise apply their

modeling technique to the variability of feed available from pasture due to weather and
other exogenous factors to Australian sheep and grain farms.

In the Wicks and Guise

study, absolute deviations of pasture yield were calculated using Hazell’s MOTAD
method. The deviations were coupled with a variant of the Fisher constant to arrive at
standard deviations.

Several levels of risk aversion were then analyzed to represent

responses to technical coefficient risk across different producer risk attitudes. Intuitively,
this approach is very similar to an E-V framework. That is, to decrease the variability of
technical coefficients, a decision maker will realize a lower net income and depending on
the individual’s attitude toward risk, will make tradeoffs accordingly.

Wicks and Guise

even suggest that solutions from such a model should trace out a risk efficient frontier
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similar to that of a usual E-V framework. Furthermore, they state that the frontier should
also provide a means of ranking farm plans for these sheep and grain operations much the
same as Thompson and Hazell rank risk efficient farm plans using E-V analysis.
McCarl and Spreen offer nutrient variability in feedstuffs, one issue on which this
study focuses, as an example textbook application of the Wicks and Guise approach.
However, in their example, a fixed amount of feed is being mixed as opposed to a ration
mixed for the needs of specific animals and no empirical data are used to arrive at the
nutrient variability of feed ingredients.

Other than the example given by McCarl and

Spreen, Tice offers one of the only applications of the Wicks and Guise technique outside
of the original study.
E-V analysis (Markowitz, Freund) is very widely published in agricultural
economic literature and deals with uncertainty of contributions to the objective function
of a mathematical programming model, such as the prices of feed ingredients in a
minimum cost feed ration model.

However, there has been considerable debate as to

whether E-V analysis is a theoretically appropriate method to represent optimal decision
making.

It is generally agreed upon that expected utility theory (von Neuman and

Morgenstern) provides the theoretical base for choice facing uncertainty.

E-V analysis

can be consistent with expected utility theory in three cases: (1) the underlying income
distribution is normal (Freund), (2) the distributions of the decision variable differ only
by location and scale (Meyer), and (3) the underlying utility function is quadratic
(Markowitz, Tobin).

If any of these conditions are present it is generally agreed upon

that E-V analysis is indeed consistent with expected utility theory. Many applications to
agricultural decision making have used the satisfaction of one or more of the
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aforementioned conditions to justify the use of E-V to model the decisions of producers
when faced with net income risk (Boisvert and McCarl; Dillon, 1999; Dillon, 1992). In
addition to these studies empirical evidence demonstrates the closeness of E-V analysis to
the expected utility maximizing choices (Levy and Markowitz).

Given this demonstrated

consistency of E-V analysis with economic theory and its extensive use in modeling
agricultural risk, it is an appropriate way to model an agricultural producer’s response to
uncertainty of input or output prices.
The well-established history of the feed ration linear programming formulation
and the obvious impact of uncertainty on the selection of an optimal feed ration warrants
the expansion of that formulation to allow producers to manage the risks associated with
selecting a minimum cost feed ration.

The importance of nutrient variability in feed

ingredients is evident in recent attention given it by animal science studies (Cromwell et
al., DePeters et al.). This importance makes it appropriate to give this form of risk ample
consideration in selecting feed rations.

Expanding the traditional model to include the

Wicks and Guise technique offers a method of doing just that. The increasing acceptance
of E-V analysis as a means of dealing with objective function risk suggests that it is a
suitable means of addressing the uncertainty of feed ingredient prices.
In the following section the data necessary to specify an economic model that
combines the traditional minimum cost feed ration model with both Merrill’s approach
and an E-V component is presented.

With this data the economic model is specified.

Results showing how producers can utilize the model in the selection of a feed ration to
manage both price risk and nutrient variability are then presented with conclusions
following.
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Data
Feed ingredient prices were collected from Feedstuffs, for the Chicago market,
between 1993 and 1999, with four exceptions. Alfalfa hay and prairie grass hay prices
were collected from the USDA Oklahoma weekly hay report for the same time period.
Hay data were collected from Oklahoma due to the fact that no prolonged hay price series
for the Chicago market could be found. Current bulk prices for limestone and dicalcium
phosphate were used in lieu of a historic price series.

Historic prices of these

supplements are not generally recorded due to the extremely low variability and therefore
could not be obtained.

This should not pose any limitations to the study since

supplements such as limestone and dicalcium phosphate generally comprise a very small
component of total ration cost and have price series that exhibit little variability.

All

prices were left in nominal terms in the interest of simulating real world conditions in
which producers face the risks associated with nominal prices of inputs.

Descriptive

statistics for the price series of all feed ingredients being considered are presented in
Table 3.1. In addition to prices of feed ingredients, expected nutritional composition and
variability must be specified.
The expected levels and variability of nutrients in all feed ingredients were
obtained from the 2001 NRC Nutrient Requirements of Dairy Cattle. These data rely on
various sources including the 1996 (and 2000 Update) NRC Nutrient Requirements of
Beef Cattle.

The expected levels and standard deviations of the relevant nutrients are

shown in Table 3.2. It should be mentioned that the standard deviations for NEg and
NEm were not reported explicitly.

This is due to the fact that direct measurement of

levels of NEm and NEg requires laborious feeding experiments.
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The alternative to

feeding experiments is to approximate amounts of the energies using accepted functional
relationships, as defined by the NRC, between each of them and acid detergent fiber
(ADF).

NRC 2001 reports ADF values and standard deviations allowing the standard

deviation of ADF to be taken through the appropriate transformations to arrive at
standard deviations for NEg and NEm.

A mathematical presentation of this

transformation is presented in the Appendix to this chapter.

With the nutritional

composition of the available feedstuffs specified, it is also necessary to determine the
nutritional requirements of the animals to set the right hand side lower limits for the
nutritional constraints within the model.
The nutrient requirements for medium frame steers were obtained from the 1984
Edition of NRC Nutrient Requirements of Beef Cattle.

Instead of using the reported

tables, the equations that specify these requirements as they relate to body weight, target
average daily gain, and dry matter intake were used. This allows the model to determine
a ration given only a body weight and target average daily gain and does not limit these
values to integers. These equations are presented as a part of the economic model in the
following section.

This set of data fulfills the requirements of the specification of an

economic model that considers both nutrient and price variability in the selection of feed
rations. These data are sufficient to specify a model that will address both feed ingredient
nutrient variability and price fluctuation.

The Economic Model
The economic model in this study expands the traditional minimum cost feed
ration model to the selection of rations that are optimal, given individual risk aversion,
for a typical beef backgrounder facing uncertain feed ingredient prices and variable
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nutrient levels in available feedstuffs.

Producers will respond differently to these

uncertainties, depending on their attitude toward risk. The methodology in this particular
study assumes that the producer will minimize total feed costs depending on his or her
individual aversion to feed ingredient price risk and variability of nutrients in those feed
ingredients and that this selection of an optimal ration is the equivalent of maximizing
utility.
The model is designed to choose the amount of each feed ingredient, in pounds, as
fed per-head-per-day. The objective function is specified as follows:
(3.1)
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(3.4e) 0.0557 W 0.75 ( ADG) 1.097 − LL NEg = 0
(3.4f) 2 ( 0.0154W + 0.071GP) − LL Ca = 0
(3.4g) 1.18 (0.028W + 0.039GP − LL P = 0
 268 − 1.638W 0.75 ADG 1.097 
ADG = GP
(3.4h) 
ADG



(3.5)

Fj ≥ 0, ∀ j

Indices include:
t = time period (i.e., week) with T representing the total number of ,
j = individual feed ingredients and may represent corn, soybean meal (44% crude
protein), soybean meal (49% crude protein), corn gluten feed, distiller’s dried grain,
brewer’s dried grain, dehydrated alfalfa,wheat middlings; alfalfa hay, or prairie grass
hay and
i = individual nutrients and may represent net energy for maintenance (NEm), net energy
available for gain (NEg), protein (pr), Calcium (Ca), or phosphorous (P)
d = indicates that the amount of a nutrient is measured as fed in the actual ration.
Endogenous decision variables are:
RCt = ration cost in time t,
RC = mean ration cost over all t,
Fj = Feed ingredient j, and
DMI = total dry matter intake of pounds of feed per day by an animal.
Exogenous components of the model are:
pj,t
= price of the jth feed ingredient in time t,
W
= body weight of the animal in kilograms and,
ADG = target average daily weight gain in kilograms,
GP
= grams of protein deposited in the muscle tissue of an animal, and
2
σ i,j = the variance of the ith nutrient in the jth feed ingredient
Right hand side lower limits are:
LLi = lower limits of all nutrients (i).
Risk aversion parameters are:
Ψ = nutrient variability aversion parameter and
Φ = price risk aversion parameter.
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The objective function (Equation 3.1) minimizes the risk-adjusted, mean total
ration cost per head per day. This is represented by RC less a penalty for variability in
RCt . This penalty is composed of the variance of RCt across all time periods multiplied
by the price risk aversion parameter Φ. This price risk aversion parameter was specified
using the approach offered by McCarl and Bessler in which Φ = 2 Zα / Sy . In this
formulation

Zα = the standardized normal one-tailed Z value of an α level of

significance, and Sy is the relevant standard deviation under risk neutral decisions levels.
In this study, Sy was calculated using 500 pound medium frame steers being fed to
achieve two pounds of average daily gain (ADG) by a producer with a risk neutral
attitude. This class of livestock is very common among Kentucky backgrounders and the
risk aversion parameters resulting from this standard deviation should adequately
represent a backgrounder’s attitude toward price variability across all sizes of livestock
and all target average daily gains. The E-V quadratic variance term obviously introduces
non-linearity into this objective function.

The availability of non-linear programming

(NLP) solvers makes it relatively easy to deal with this nonlinearity. McCarl and Spreen
suggest that in most cases it is no longer necessary to attempt to transform the objective
function into a linear form and that it is often more efficient to allow the solver to deal
with the nonlinearity.

The objective function is minimized subject to several necessary

constraints (Equations 3.2 to 3.5).
Equations 3.2 and 3.3 define RC and RC . The sum of the prices of each feed
ingredient (pj,t ) times the amounts of the corresponding feed ingredient included in the
ration (Fj) is equal to the total ration cost per head per day in time period t (RC t ). The
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mean of RCt across all t is RC . In addition to these constraints, the ration must meet
certain nutritional requirements (also including a risk aversion component) as show in
Equation 3.4.

Specifically, the ration must contain adequate amounts of NEm, NEg,

protein, calcium, and phosphorous. Equations 3.4a to 3.4h define nutritional lower limits
for equation 3.4.
Lower limits (LLi) for all nutrients considered by this model were specified using
equations in the 1984 NRC Nutrient Requirements for Medium Frame Steers (as shown
in Equations 3.4a to 3.4h).4 Equations 3.4a to 3.4c define the protein requirement. This
model uses the exact equations defined by the 1984 NRC guidelines to define this
requirement.

In the past feed ration selection models have approximated dry matter

intake as opposed to calculating the actual NEm in the ration in megacalories per
kilogram (NEmd) and DMI directly. This is largely due to the fact that the relationship
between NEmd, DMI, and LLpr is nonlinear.

This particular study opts for calculation

procedure of the protein requirement presented in NRC 1984 to avoid relying on an
exogenous approximation of DMI. The nonlinear constraints did not pose a problem to
the NLP solver and this method will be closer to a true optimization than an approach that
utilizes an approximation. Calculation of the lower limits (LLi) for NEm, NEg, calcium,
and phosphorous, which are linear, are shown in equation 3.4d through 3.4h, respectively.
Another factor that separates this model from those in previous feed ration
selection studies is that is does not assume that the amounts of all nutrients in all
available feed ingredients are known with certainty.

4

Nutritional constraints for NEm,

The 1984 version was chosen over the more recent editions, in part due to the use of crude protein (as
opposed to metabolic protein) in specifying the protein requirements. This avoids certain technical
complexities. These complexities warrant consideration in practical ration balancing applications and
nutritional research but would add very little to this specific discussion.
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NEg, and protein are expanded from traditional nutritional lower limit constraints to
address the variability of these nutrients in available feed ingredients.

Specifically, these

constraints are made more binding by multiplying the nutrient risk aversion parameter
(Ψ) by the standard deviation of the relevant nutrient in the entire ration
(

( ∑F σ )
2
j

2
i,j

1/2

).

Only binding constraints are affected by this approach (Wicks and

Guise; McCarl and Spreen).

However, this poses no real problem since, as noted by

McCarl and Spreen, uncertainty in non-binding constraints is of little concern to a
decision maker. However, for binding constraints it is reasonable that a decision maker
would seek to manage the uncertainty surrounding the technical coefficients of inputs.
The nutrient risk aversion parameter (Ψ) was specified assuming nutrient levels
across feed ingredient samples are normally distributed.

Standardized normal one-tail z

values corresponding to levels of risk aversion represent nutrient risk aversion
parameters.

This ensures that the binding constraint(s) become more binding in a way

that shows an individual’s desire to increase the probability of realizing the required
nutrient level in a feed ration. For example, to represent an individual who would prefer
to be certain of realizing at least the required amount of a nutrient 65% of the time (as
opposed to 50% of the time for risk neutral), the z score that represents the 65th percentile
of the normal distribution was used. The two exceptions to this are the constraints for
phosphorous and calcium.

For these constraints it is assumed that Ψ is equal to zero.

While the levels of calcium and phosphorous do vary in many available feed ingredients
their levels are, for all practical purposes, constant in limestone and dicalcium phosphate.
Since these ingredients can be used to fulfill the entire requirement for both calcium and
phosphorous and still represent less than 3% of the ration cost, it is reasonable to assume
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that decision makers would not devote time and energy to managing the variability to
these minerals in the ration.

Variability of nutrients for all feedstuffs is defined as the

standard deviation of nutrients (σi,j) as reported in the 2000 NRC Nutrient Requirements
of Beef Cattle.

This availability of standard deviations of nutrients in selected feed

ingredients makes it possible to use these to directly model Merrill’s approach.
With the economic model defined in this section it is possible to select rations that
are not simply minimum cost but optimal to a decision maker given his or her aversion to
nutrient variability and price risk.
following section.

The model will be specified for specific cases in the

The results of these specifications will be presented and discussed.

Following these results a brief summary along with conclusions will be offered.

Selection of Optimal Rations
Optimal rations were chosen for numerous model specifications to account for
different weights of livestock (W), different target average daily gains (ADG), and
various levels of aversion to nutrient and price risk. The livestock classification of
medium frame steers was used in all cases and W was varied from 400 to 800 pounds in
100-pound increments to account for the growth of animals in a typical backgrounding
program.

ADG was varied across 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 pounds per day. Nutritional

requirements for a 500-pound, medium frame steer, as calculated by the model, are as
follows: 666.50 grams of crude protein, 29.31 grams of calcium, 14.70 grams of
phosphorous, 2.93 megacalories of available NEg, and 4.51 megacalories of NEm.
Requirements for all other sizes of livestock considered under each target ADG are not
reported. It is important to again note that these requirements are reported as calculated
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by the model given only W and ADG.

Varying levels of both nutrient and price risk

aversion were specified by varying Zα in the calculation of each.

Varying levels of

aversion to nutrient variability (Ψ) were considered over a wide range of significance
levels.

Only the levels of 0.50 (risk neutral), 0.60 (low aversion), 0.80 (medium

aversion), and 0.90 (high aversion), indicating a desire to realize at least the required
amount of nutrients 50%, 60%, 80%, and 90% of the time, are reported. Significance
levels of 0.50 (risk neutral), 0.75, 0.80, and 0.85 represent the four reported levels of
price risk aversion.

These represent an individual’s preference to realize the same or

lower feed costs 50%, 75%, 80%, or 85% of the time, respectively.
Optimal rations were then determined for all combinations of W, ADG, Ψ, and Φ.
However, given the substantial amount of information this generated (240 separate model
runs), only the optimal ration compositions for 500-pound medium frame steers fed for 2
pounds ADG will be discussed.5 The compositions of the rations are presented in Table
3.3.

The corresponding mean costs, standard deviations of costs, and coefficients of

variation of cost are presented in Table 3.4. It should be noted that, while these rations
meet basic nutritional needs, no formal constraint addresses the amount of roughage in
the diet.

A certain level of roughage is needed to maintain rumen function.

formal constraint addresses total intake.

Also, no

Inclusions of these constraints would allow for

the calculation of more practical diets. However the risk management principles that are
central to this study can be adequately demonstrated without their inclusion.

Thus

omitting these constraints should not detract from the overall value of the study. From

5

Results of other specifications were, qualitatively, very similar with respect of both price and nutrient risk
management. These results are available upon request from the authors.
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these results it is possible to determine the model responses to both nutrient and price risk
aversion as well as the costs of these responses.
From the twelve available ingredients, the model balanced rations primarily using
either a combination of corn and wheat middlings or corn and corn gluten feed.
Distiller’s dried grain entered in small amounts as the aversion to nutrient risk was
increased.

Limestone entered every ration as an inexpensive, non-variable source of

minerals. The amounts of limestone are very small and of consistent magnitude. In the
remainder of the discussion, no further mention will be given to limestone as a
component of the ration.

These basic trends in the composition of the feed rations

provide for interesting discussion concerning the management of price and nutrient risk
to arrive at optimal rations.
The minimum cost feasible ration assuming no aversion to nutrient or price risk is
composed approximately equal amounts of corn and wheat middlings.

As aversion to

nutrient risk is increased with no consideration given to price risk, the model effectively
manages the variability of NEg, as the NEg constraint is the most binding constraint.
Constraints for NEm, protein, calcium, and phosphorous are, in most cases, not binding
and are therefore are virtually unaffected by Merrill’s approach. As nutrient risk aversion
is increased to the Low and even Medium level, the model response is to simply add
more of the feed ingredient that comprised the minimum cost ration. This appears to be
the least cost method of increasing the probability of meeting the NEg requirement, since
the increase in the mean amount of available NEg will be greater than that of the standard
deviation.

The result is a total ration with a less volatile amount of NEg, in terms of

coefficient of variation.
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An illustration of the risk management response described above is illustrated by
increasing the probability of meeting the NEg requirement from 50% to 80% while
ignoring price risk.

This adjustment involves increasing the amount of corn and wheat

middlings by 0.84 and 0.02 pounds, respectively. The result of this ration adjustment is
that, with all external factors such as weather and health being equal, the probability that
the animals will gain at least 2 pounds per day is increased from 50% to 80%.

The

amount of NEg in the risk averse ration is less variable, in terms of the coefficient of
variation. This is shown in Table 3.5, which displays the effects of risk management on
variability of NEg.

Specifically, the coefficient of variation decreases by 0.40%.

However, as shown in Table 3.4, this increase in certainty of realizing the NEg
requirement comes at a cost of about $0.03 per head per day. It is also worthwhile to
note that managing for nutrient variability, while ignoring price variability, generally
results in a moderate increase. This tradeoff between a higher ration cost and a higher
probability of realizing the required NEg is presented as a frontier of nutrient risk
efficient points in Figure 3.1. Selecting among rations located on the frontier would
require a decision maker to compare the risk management benefit to the cost of achieving
it given their attitude toward risk and choose accordingly. In addition to controlling the
variability of the NEg in the ration, the model can select rations with a more stable price
series.
Upon introduction of aversion to price risk, assuming nutrient risk neutrality, the
model looks to substitute among available feedstuffs to arrive at an optimal ration. At the
75% price risk aversion level, wheat middlings leave the optimal combination entirely
and corn gluten feed enters. This is to be expected since, as shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.1,
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the composition of the two feeds are very similar while corn gluten feed has a price series
that is roughly half as variable, in terms of coefficient of variation.

All rations that are

balanced assuming some level of aversion to price risk are primarily comprised of corn
and corn gluten feed.

As price risk aversion increases, however, the amounts of corn

gluten feed in the ration increases and the amount of corn decreases, proportionally (See
Table 3.3).

This substitution of corn gluten feed for corn in optimal ration results in a

decrease in the standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the price of the ration.
Table 5 shows this reduction in volatility. Much the same as nutrient risk management,
price risk management comes at a cost.

Specifically, the optimal ration for a producer

who is 75% price risk averse costs about $0.01 more per head per day compared to the
risk neutral cost minimizing ration. However the coefficient of variation is only 17.06%,
compared to 23.65% for the risk neutral optimal ration.

Depending upon an individual’s

attitude toward price risk, any of these rations listed in Table 3.3 might be optimal. It
would be up to the decision maker to select among all risk efficient choices, which would
include some ration combinations not reported in Table 3.3, to arrive at a ration that
matches his or her desire to control price variability.
The set of available ration choices is presented in a mean-variance framework as
an E-V frontier in Figure 2. For the sake of a smoother graph, the figure contains several
levels of risk aversion in addition to the reported levels. This E-V frontier is presented as
a set of risk efficient expenses and thus appears as the mirror image of the more common
presentation of a set of returns.

This frontier shows the possibility of accepting higher

expenses for the sake of less variable feed expenses and therefore the ability to manage
net income risk with the selection of optimal feed rations. Presenting such a frontier to a
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producer allows a risk averse producer to see the increases in mean costs necessary to
achieve a given variance of feed expense and then make tradeoffs to arrive at his or her
optimal solution (McCarl and Spreen).

For example, in a 150-day backgrounding

program, to achieve the price variance associated with the optimal ration for the most
price risk averse producer $3.00 of revenue per head would be forgone. While price and
nutrient risk can be managed independently, the model can consider both simultaneously.
It is important to examine the way in which managing for price risk affects
nutrient variability and vice versa.

For instance, moving from price risk neutral to the

75% level of price risk aversion while ignoring nutrient risk increases the standard
deviation of NEg while the mean level remains the same. This results in an increase in
the coefficient of variation of NEg from 16.65% to 20.32%. While other examples are
less drastic, accounting for higher levels of price risk aversion within a given level of
nutrient risk aversion always increases the variability (in terms of the coefficient of
variation) of NEg. On the other hand, managing for nutrient risk while holding price risk
constant generally results in a slight decrease of the coefficient of variation of total ration
cost. The model has the capacity to manage both types of risks, but there are tradeoffs
for doing so.

Depending upon a decision maker’s attitude toward nutrient variability

and/or price risk he or she can evaluate these tradeoffs and determine individual optimal
rations accordingly.

The results of this study indicate that after such an evaluation the

ration that is optimal to a nutrient or price risk averse producer will be noticeably
different than the minimum cost ration that would be recommended by traditional
models.
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Summary and Conclusions
Given the impact of feed cost on total livestock production expense the
determination of a feed ration warrants careful consideration by livestock producers.
Historically, agricultural economic research has approached this procedure by identifying
the minimum cost combination of available feed ingredients that satisfy nutritional
requirements using linear programming.

Linear programming models that select

minimum cost feed rations have had a pronounced presence in academic research and are
prevalent as applied decision tools.

Although useful, these models have generally

imposed the assumptions that feed ingredient nutritional compositions and prices are
known with certainty. Livestock producers indeed do not know these with certainty and
must select feed ingredients in a risky environment with regard to nutrient composition
and prices of feed ingredients.

Therefore, it is worthwhile to expand the traditional

models to choose optimal rations considering variability in the nutritional compositions
and prices of feed ingredients.
The traditional model can be expanded to consider nutrient variability and price
risk using Merrill’s approach and E-V analysis, respectively.

Expanding the model in

this way makes both methodological and applied contributions to agricultural economic
research.

The generally ignored issues of real world nutrient and price uncertainty are

introduced into a very well researched area of livestock economics, that is, feed ration
selection. Results show that minimum cost feed rations are not optimal to all producers.
Furthermore, the problematic issue of technical coefficient risk is addressed using a
modeling technique that is novel with the exception of its initial application.

The

expanded model allows decision makers to select rations that are optimal subject to their
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aversion to nutrient variability and/or price risk.
the expense increasing the ration cost.

Managing either type of risk comes at

If a decision maker evaluates the situation and

determines that risk management benefits outweigh the expense then there are methods
for dealing with both feed ingredient nutrient and price risk.
In general, producers wishing to control only the variability of nutrients in the
ration should increase the amounts of the optimal ingredients.

The magnitude of this

increase will vary depending on which ingredients are in the optimal ration with no
consideration given to risk.
simultaneously.

However this is not true when managing for both risks

In these cases the model does substitute among available ingredients by

changing the relative amounts of ingredients in the ration and bringing in small amounts
of new ingredients. Controlling price risk requires substituting among inputs in all cases.
In some cases new ingredients enter the optimal ration while at other times the relative
amounts of the ingredients in the base ration is changed. New ingredients are expected to
have a higher expected price but will have a less variable price series, as was shown by
corn gluten feed replacing wheat middlings. Both types of risk management come at the
expense of increasing ration cost. For example, in this study a producer who is 80% risk
averse with regards to nutrient variability and price variability would be willing to pay
$0.12 per head per day above the price of the minimum cost ration to select a ration that
is optimal to him or her. Using these results and basic methods of managing nutrient and
price risks advanced decision tools can be developed.

Alternative rations can be

presented in the form of a set of risk efficient choices as was done in this study. Decision
makers can then weigh the costs and benefits of all feasible alternatives then formulate
rations that are better suited to their individual attitude toward risk.
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Appendix to Chapter III
NRC 2000 reports the standard deviations of acid detergent fiber (ADF) in selected
feedstuffs. Metabolizable energy (ME) can be expressed as a linear function of ADF that
depends upon the type of feed ingredient in question (American Feed Manufacturers
Association). Given this information, it is a very systematic procedure to transform the
standard deviation of ADF into the standard deviation of ME. The relationship between
ME and both net energy for maintenance and net energy for gain is approximated by the
NRC 1984 and 2000 as:
(A3.1)

NEm = 0.0105 ME3 – 0.138 ME2 + 1.37 ME – 1.12

and
(A3.2)

NEg = 0.0122 ME3 – 0.174 ME2 + 1.42 ME – 1.65.

The statistical properties of a function are such that for a function:
(A3.3)

Y = aX3 + bX2 + cX + d,

where X is a normally distributed, random variable it is true that:
(A3.4)

Var(Y) = a2 [ E(x6 ) - E(x3 )2 ] + b2 [E(x4 ) - E(x3 )2 ] + c2 [E(x2 ) – E(x)2 ]
+ 2ab[E(x3 ) - E(x3 ) E(x2 )] + 2ac[E(x4 ) - E(x3 ) E(x)]
+ 2bc[E(x3 ) - E(x2 ) E(x)].

In this notation, E(xi)k represents the ith moment of x raised to the kth power (if k is
omitted it is understood that k = 1). It is possible to derive the standard deviations for
NEm and NEg in feedstuffs for which standard deviations of ADF are reported based on
the first six moments of the functions for NEm and NEg expressed in terms of ME.
Assuming that NEg, NEm, and ME are normally distributed these moments can be
expressed in terms of the mean and variance of those functions using the moment
generating function:

(mt+1/2t σ )
2

(A3.5)

e

2
ME, j

where the limit of the ith derivative of e with respect to t as t approaches zero is the ith
moment of the distribution. Following this procedure, the first six moments of the ME
distribution were calculated and used to arrive at the standard deviations of NEm and
NEg in every feed ingredient.
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics of Feed Ingredient Price Series Available to the
Model

Alfalfa Hay
Brewer’s Dried Grain
Corn
Corn Gluten Feed
Dehydrated Alfalfa
DiCalcium Phosphate
Distiller’s Dried Grain
Limestone
Prairie Grass Hay
Soybean Meal (44%)2
Soybean Meal (49%)2
Wheat Middlings

Mean
($ / ton)

Standard Deviation
($ / ton)

C.V.1
(%)

Max
($ / ton)

Min
($ / ton)

93.03
102.81
97.12
96.50
128.17
380.00
124.62
110.00
66.62
193.12
205.93
74.55

13.77
25.15
22.09
13.97
12.18
0.00
16.26
0.00
9.35
37.53
36.85
21.01

14.81
24.47
22.74
14.47
9.51
0.00
13.05
0.00
14.04
19.44
17.89
28.18

125.00
155.00
187.50
141.00
150.00
380.00
185.00
110.00
82.50
299.00
310.00
150.00

55.00
65.00
71.43
76.00
110.00
380.00
93.00
110.00
50.00
136.00
148.00
45.00

Source: Alfalfa and Prairie Grass Hay were taken from various weekly USDA Oklahoma Hay reports,
prices for Limestone and Dicalcium Phosphate are November 2000 bulk prices, all other price series came
from 365 consecutive weekly observations from Ingredient Market Report. Feedstuffs. 1993 to 1999.
1. C.V. = coefficient of variation and is the standard deviation expressed as a percentage of the mean.
2. 44% and 49% represent the estimated crude protein available in each type of soybean meal
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Table 3.2. Dry Matter Basis Nutritional Composition of Feed Ingredients
Dry Matter NEm1
NEg1 Crude Protein
(%)
(Mcal/kg) (Mcal/kg)
(%)

Calcium Phosphorous
(%)
(%)

Alfalfa Hay

90.90
(2.06)

1.14
(0.137) 4

0.58
(0.144) 4

17.00
(1.63)

1.19
(0.01)

0.24
(0.06)

Brewer’s Dried Grain

90.20
(3.70)

1.51
(0.014) 4

0.91
(0.015) 4

29.20
(13.0)

0.29
(0.10)

0.70
(0.05)

Corn

90.00
(0.88)

2.24
(0.194) 4

1.55
(0.211) 4

9.80
(1.06)

0.03
(0.07)

0.32
(0.04)

Corn Gluten Feed

90.00
(1.69)

1.94
(0.174) 4

1.30
(0.188) 4

23.80
(1.06)

0.07
(0.05)

0. 95
(0.29)

Dehydrated Alfalfa

91.80
(1.50)

1.34
(0.057) 4

0.77
(0.060) 4

18.90
(0.68)

1.51
(0.13)

0.25
(0.02)

DiCalcium Phosphate

97.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00) 4

0.00
(0.00) 4

0.00
(0.00)

22.00
(0.00)

19.30
(0.00)

Distiller’s Dried Grain

90.30
(2.19)

2.18
(0.340) 4

1.50
(0.368) 4

30.40
(3.55)

0.26
(0.23)

0.83
(0.15)

Limestone

1.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00) 4

0.00
(0.00) 4

0.00
(0.00)

34.00
(0.00)

0.02
(0.00)

Prairie Grass Hay2

91.00
(1.42)

1.00
(0.137) 4

0.45
(0.144) 4

6.40
(1.63)

0.35
(0.01)

0.14
(0.06)

Soybean Meal (44%)3

89.10
(1.22)

2.06
(0.004) 4

1.40
(0.004) 4

49.90
(1.25)

0.40
(0.11)

0.71
(0.04)

Soybean Meal (49%)3

90.90
(1.88)

2.06
(0.228) 4

1.40
(0.247) 4

51.80
(3.45)

0.46
(0.80)

0.73
(0.20)

Wheat Middlings

89.30
(1.49)

1.60
(0.017) 4

1.00
(0.018) 4

18.7
(1.15)

0.17
(0.15)

1.01
(0.13)

Source: 2000 Update of the 1996 National Resource Council (NRC) Nutrient Requirements for Beef Cattle
Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Some the relative standard deviations were
considered suspect according to expert opinion. Specifically, the NEg variability of corn relative to wheat
middlings was higher than anticipated. Changing these data could obviously affect the model results as the
NEg constraint is the most binding. Experimentation on the relative variability based on more recent feed
ingredient data (NRC 2001) did not qualitatively alter the results.
1. NEm = Net Energy Required for Maintenance, NEg = Net Energy Required for Gain
2. No standard deviation for ADF in prairie grass was reported, therefore NEm and NEg variances for
alfalfa hay were used to approximate the corresponding variances in prairie grass hay.
3. 44% and 49% represent the estimated crude protein concentration in each type of soybean meal on an as
fed basis. The compositions are reported on a dry matter basis, resulting in higher reported protein levels.
4. Variability data for Soybean Meal (44%) was questionable due to a very small sample size. Due to this
variability data for Soybean Meal (49%) was also used for Soybean Meal (49%).
5. The standard deviations for NEm and NEg are not reported by the NRC but were calculated based on
their functional relationship to Acid Detergent Fiber (ADF) and the NRC reported standard deviations for
ADF. See the appendix to this chapter for a detailed explanation of this relationship.
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Table 3.3. Compositions of Feed Rations for 500 pound Medium Frame Steers Fed
for 2 Pounds Average Daily Gain Across Price and Nutrient Risk Aversion Levels
Price Risk
Aversion1
(%)

Nutrient
Risk Aversion2

Corn

50

Neutra
Low
Medium
High

5.64
5.95
6.38
1.17

75

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

5.74
5.58
5.64
5.54

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

4.88
5.04
5.18
5.17

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

4.23
4.58
4.74
4.84

80

85

Wheat
Distiller’s
Corn Gluten
Midds
Dried Grain
Feed
(Pounds / head / day on an As Fed Basis)
5.80
5.82
5.82
12.86

Limestone

0.16
0.16
0.16
0.13

0.56

4.47
5.11
5.61
5.63

0.18
0.18
0.17
0.17

0.20
0.73

5.48
5.75
5.91
5.84

0.18
0.18
0.17
0.17

0.44
0.89

6.24
6.29
6.12
6.04

0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17

Note: While these rations meet basic nutritional needs, no formal constraint was specified to address the
amount of roughage in the diet. A certain level of roughage is needed to maintain rumen function. Also,
no formal constraint addresses total intake.
1. Feed price risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler.
A brief explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper. See
McCarl and Bessler for a detailed presentation.
2. Nutrient risk aversion coefficients are the standardized normal one-tailed Z values corresponding to 0.50
(Neutral), 0.60 (Low), 0.80 (Medium), and 0.90 (High) levels of significance.
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Table 3.4. Means, Standard Deviations, and Coefficients of Variation (C.V.) of Feed
Ration Costs for 500-pound Medium Frame Steers Fed for Two Pounds Average
Daily Gain Across Price and Nutrient Risk Aversion Levels
Price Risk
Nutrient
Aversion1 Risk Aversion2

(%)
50

Mean
Standard Deviation
(Dollars / head / day)

C.V.

(%)

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

0.499
0.515
0.535
0.543

0.118
0.121
0.126
0.146

23.65
23.50
23.55
26.89

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

0.504
0.527
0.554
0.585

0.086
0.088
0.092
0.094

17.06
16.70
16.61
16.07

80

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

0.511
0.531
0.559
0.588

0.083
0.086
0.090
0.093

16.24
16.20
16.10
15.82

85

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

0.516
0.535
0.563
0.591

0.081
0.085
0.089
0.092

15.70
15.89
15.81
15.57

75

1. Feed price risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler.
A brief explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper. See
McCarl and Bessler for a detailed presentation.
2. Nutrient risk aversion coefficients are the standardized normal one-tailed Z values corresponding to 0.50
(Neutral), 0.60 (Low), 0.80 (Medium), 0.90 (High) levels of significance.
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Table 3.5. Means, Standard Deviations, and Coefficients of Variation (C.V.) of Net
Energy Available for Gain in Rations for 500-pound Medium Frame Steers Fed for
Two Pounds Average Daily Gain Across Price and Nutrient Risk Aversion Levels
Price Risk
Nutrient
Aversion1 Risk Aversion2
(%)

Mean
(Mcal)

StDev
(Mcal)

C.V.
(%)

50

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

2.933
3.131
3.397
3.111

0.488
0.515
0.552
0.139

16.65
16.44
16.24
4.48

75

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

2.933
3.172
3.481
3.766

0.603
0.621
0.651
0.650

20.56
19.59
18.69
17.26

80

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

2.933
3.171
3.470
3.757

0.596
0.620
0.638
0.643

20.32
19.54
18.38
17.11

85

Neutral
Low
Medium
High

2.933
3.173
3.461
3.752

0.603
0.624
0.628
0.639

20.57
19.68
18.13
17.04

1. Feed price risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler.
A brief explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper. See
McCarl and Bessler for a detailed presentation.
2. Nutrient risk aversion coefficients are the standardized normal one-tailed Z values corresponding to 0.50
(Neutral), 0.60 (Low), 0.80 (Medium), 0.90 (High) levels of significance.
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Figure 3.1. Mean-Probability Frontier of Nutrient Risk Efficient Ration Choices for
a 500-Pound Medium Frame Steer Fed for Two Pounds Average Daily Gain
Assuming Price Risk Neutrality

Mean Ration Cost
($ / head / day)

$0.54
$0.53
$0.52
$0.51
$0.50
$0.49
50.00%

60.00%
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Probability of Meeting the NEg Requirement
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80.00%

Figure 3.2. Mean-Variance (E-V) Frontier or Risk Efficient Ration Choices for a
500-Pound Medium Frame Steer Fed for Two Pounds Average Daily Gain
Assuming Nutrient Risk Neutrality
0.525

Mean Ration Cost

0.52
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0.0080

0.0100

Variance of Ration Cost
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CHAPTER IV
INTRODUCING THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED
LIVESTOCK INSURANCE AS A RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL

Introduction
Over the past few years, there has been a noticeable change in agricultural policy
that has involved expanding the role of risk management and insurance. Subsidized crop
insurance that insures either crop yields or revenues has been the focus of much
legislation and debate.

In general, crop insurance programs involve government

subsidies to producers to cover a portion of insurance premiums along with reinsurance
(and, in some cases, direct subsidies) to private firms that provide the insurance. While
these programs offer farmers a means of risk management, they have often been costly
and have drawn criticism for the incentives they create (Skees 1999a, Turvey). Recent
legislation has now cleared the way to introduce similar insurance programs for livestock.
Currently, the USDA’s Risk Management Agency is evaluating proposals for livestock
insurance products to be used in pilot programs.

Like crop insurance programs, these

programs have the potential to establish risk sharing markets that will allow producers to
manage net income risk associated with livestock production and, if subsidized by the
government, also have the potential to introduce perverse incentives to livestock
producers.

With this in mind, it is worthwhile to carefully evaluate the situation of

livestock producers and the potential effects of subsidized livestock insurance.
Given the lack of vertical integration or cooperation in the beef industry, beef
producers generally have limited opportunity to share the risk of their respective
operations and are left to design individual risk management strategies. One type of risk
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that greatly influences profitability is marketing or price risk.

Futures market hedging

and cash forward contracting provide opportunities to manage price risk. However, these
alternatives come at a cost. For example, futures options offer a mechanism to establish a
price floor for some premium.

If futures markets function efficiently, this premium

reflects the true value of the option. Producers realize that they will not always exercise
these options and therefore in some years will actually forgo income in exchange for
being insured against possible loss. Thus, the option premium (and therefore the risk it is
priced to manage) is internalized into their decision-making process.

In general, the

premiums a producer will expect to pay are at least as much as the payments they realize,
over the long run.

The same can be said for actuarially fair price insurance, which

functions much like a European put option and can only be exercised when it expires. As
long as these instruments are fairly priced, decision makers will choose to utilize them or
not based upon their individual risk preference. Specifically, more risk averse producers
will forgo a larger proportion of expected income to realize a given decrease in the
variability of that income.
If the same risk management instruments are offered with subsidized premiums,
the true risk is not internalized into the decision-making process and as a result,
producers will be inclined to take on more risk than they would with fairly priced
insurance (Skees 1999b). In the case of beef production, this can mean producing more
beef and/or producing beef under riskier conditions.

As producers realize that the true

value of the insurance is greater than the amount they must pay, they are likely to expand
their operations to levels that result in their being exposed to the same level of risk as
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they were prior to the subsidy. This behavior has been shown in some studies regarding
subsidized crop insurance and crop production (Skees 1999a and 1999b, Turvey).
The general objective of this study is to highlight the effects of government
subsidized insurance on the actual risk faced by livestock producers.

Three possible

marketing alternatives that a livestock producers might face will be evaluated: (1) selling
feeder cattle with no means of price protection, (2) purchasing actuarially fair European
put options, and (3) purchasing insurance in the form of European put options with a
portion of the premium subsidized by the government.

Each alternative will be ranked

according to its risk efficiency for a variety of risk attitudes ranging from risk preferring
to risk neutral to risk averse. Ranking will be done using Expected Value Variance (E-V)
Analysis and Stochastic Dominance Criteria.

Consequently, a contribution of this study

that goes beyond the objectives will be a comparison on stochastic dominance and E-V
analysis that will highlight similarities and differences in the performance of the two
commonly used dominance criteria. Results from both dominance analyses will be used
in conjunction with economic theory and related prior research to meet the specific
objectives of this study.

These objectives include identifying which marketing

alternatives are preferred for different levels of risk aversion, measuring the impact of
subsidization on this preference and forming hypotheses of the possible effects of
subsidized insurance on beef production decisions. While not testable at this point due to
lack of data, such hypotheses will represent a useful focus for future research in this area.
Results will be of interest to policy makers wishing to implement programs that allow
livestock producers to manage marketing risk while introducing appropriate incentives to
these producers.
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To complete this analysis, it will be necessary to present a brief review of choice
under uncertainty.

This will be followed by an explanation of how the three previously

mentioned marketing alternatives of a livestock producer are simulated.

The three

alternatives can then be ranked and the results of this ranking can be discussed and
conclusions can be drawn.

Choice Facing Uncertainty
There has been a considerable amount of research directed at economic behavior
facing uncertainty.

The classic model for choice under uncertainty is the expected utility

framework as proposed by von Neuman and Moargenstern.

In this framework, an

individual will maximize utility subject to the probabilities of the occurrence of available
alternatives.

The way that a decision maker responds to the risk surrounding the

alternatives is therefore dependent upon his or her utility function. Some individuals will
prefer risky ventures due to the possibility of large payoffs.
typically said to be risk preferring.

These individuals are

Some decision makers might have risk neutral

attitudes and will give no consideration to the riskiness of an alternative but rather base
decisions on the expected or mean outcome.
risk averse.

The remaining individuals are said to be

This class of risk averse decision makers has been the subject of many

economic studies, too numerous to mention here.
Decision makers that are risk averse will seek to manage the risk associated with
their alternatives and, in some cases, will even be willing to pay to avoid entering into a
risky situation (Arrow, Pratt). This risk attitude is the fundamental basis for insurance. If
a decision maker’s utility function is known, the risk premium that they will pay to avoid

62

a risky situation can be quantified and used to arrive at willingness to pay for insurance
(Pratt). However, the specification of utility functions for livestock producers (as well as
any group of individuals) would be extremely time consuming and arduous.

Therefore

this paper will rely on methodologies that circumvent the problems associated with
specifying decision makers’ utility functions.

Conceptual Framework
While theoretically sound, the von Neumann and Moargenstern approach is very
difficult to use in an applied sense, as it requires that the utility function of the decision
maker be known and specified.

Since it is neither practical or, in some cases, even

possible to specify a decision maker’s utility function, many alternative procedures have
been developed to rank risky alternatives. In general these approaches are designed to
present a risk efficient set of choices, which is a subset of all available choices, and allow
decision makers to choose from them. Any alternative not in the risk efficient set is said
to be risk dominated and should not be considered by the decision maker. Two widely
used techniques that follow this general framework are expected value variance (E-V)
analysis and stochastic dominance criteria.
E-V analysis (Markowitz, Freund) is widely published in agricultural economic
literature as means for ranking risky decisions.

However, there has been debate as to

whether E-V analysis is a theoretically appropriate method to represent optimal decision
making.

It is generally agreed upon that expected utility theory (von Neuman and

Moargenstern) provides the theoretical base for choice facing uncertainty.
is consistent with expected utility theory in three cases:
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E-V analysis

(1) the underlying income

distribution is normal (Freund), (2) the distributions of the decision variable differ only
by location and scale (Meyer 1987), and (3) the underlying utility function is quadratic
(Markowitz, Tobin).

If any of one of these conditions is present it is generally agreed

upon that E-V analysis is indeed consistent with expected utility theory. In addition to a
presence of many economic studies, empirical evidence demonstrates the closeness of EV analysis to the expected utility maximizing choices (Levy and Markowitz).
In this study it is necessary, as mentioned earlier, to simulate livestock prices. In
general, prices are not expected to be normally distributed and therefore the returns
associated with prices may or may not be normally distributed. Furthermore, comparing
a case of no price protection with purchasing a put option, which effectively truncates a
distribution at a certain price (strike price – premium), ensures that the two alternatives
do not differ only by location and scale.

Given these shortcomings, only under the

assumption of a quadratic utility function can E-V be expected to be consistent with
expected utility theory.

This assumption is rather restrictive, given that it implies that

absolute risk aversion increases as the level of payoff increases so that at some level
marginal utility of wealth becomes negative (Robison and Barry; Hardaker, Huirne, and
Anderson).

Even though these assumptions are not met, E-V analysis is still a strong

analytical tool. Robison and Barry provide a detailed discussion of why this is true. In
the context of this study, E-V analysis provides a straightforward method of calculating
the willingness to pay for a particular marketing alternative. Such a measure will provide
results necessary for achieving the aforementioned goals of this study.

A brief

explanation of E-V analysis as it applies to this study is presented in the following
paragraph.
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If alternatives A and B are mutually exclusive and/or not correlated, they can be
ranked by calculating the certainty equivalent (CE) or risk adjusted returns for each
alternative using E-V analysis as follows:
(4.1)

CEA = E(A) - Φ(Var(A))

(4.2)

CEB = E(B) - Φ(Var(B))

where E(A) and E(B) are the expected values of A and B, respectively and Var(A) and
Var(B) represent the variance of each. Φ is a risk aversion coefficient. If CEA > CEB
then A dominates B, if the two are equal then both A and B might be in the risk efficient
set of choices. However, for two choices with equal expected returns, the one with the
lower variance is preferred (i.e., the risk dominant choice).
Given that the assumptions required for E-V to be consistent with expected utility
theory may not hold in this study, another test for dominance should be used to test the
robustness of the E-V results.

For this reason, the choices will be analyzed using

stochastic dominance (SD) criteria as a means of ranking livestock marketing strategies.
Three types of stochastic dominance are generally used to rank risky choices. These are
first degree stochastic dominance (FSD), second degree stochastic dominance (SSD), and
stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) or generalized stochastic
dominance (Meyer 1977).

SDRF is the most discriminatory and flexible test for risk

dominance among the three SD criteria mentioned (Robison and Barry; Hardaker,
Huirne, and Anderson). Also, FSD and SSD can be shown to be special cases of SDRF
(see Meyer for explanation). These characteristics of SDRF make it the most robust and
useful tool for this analysis. FSD and SSD will be referred to in parts of the analysis but
the reliance upon ranking choices will be placed upon SDRF.
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Unlike E-V analysis, which is based solely on the first two moments of a
distribution, SD criteria consider the entire distribution and therefore can generally deal
with non-normality of the distributions involved.

This is because SD places fewer

restrictions on the utility function of the decision maker and bases risk dominance on the
entire cumulative distribution function (CDF) of each alternative.
SDRF, like E-V, introduces the advantages of knowing a decision maker’s
preferences without actually eliciting utility functions.

This is accomplished by relying

on the specification of upper (Φ U) and lower (Φ L) bounds of the Pratt risk aversion
coefficient, which is often easier to estimate than a utility function (Hardaker, Huirne,
and Anderson).

Assuming an individual has a utility function U(y), then the Pratt

coefficient is equal to:
− U' ' (y)
.
U' (y)
Once Φ L and Φ U have been specified then a U(y) that minimizes
(4.3)

ΦU

∫ [B(y) - A(y) ]U ' ( y) dy

(4.4)

ΦL

is found. If the expression is positive then A is preferred to B. If the expression is zero,
SDRF cannot rank the two alternatives.
preferred to A.

If the expression is negative, B might be

To verify this A(y) – B(y) is substituted into the brackets and the

expression is reevaluated.

If the minimum of new expression is positive then B is

definitely preferred to A.

If the expression is again negative, SDRF cannot rank the

alternatives.
Both E-V and SDRF require the estimation of risk aversion coefficients. McCarl
and Bessler offer a method for calculating the Pratt risk aversion coefficient when the
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utility function is unknown.

In their formulation the decision maker is said to maximize

the lower limit of a confidence interval from a normally distributed set of returns. The
formula is:
(4.5)

Φ = 2Z

α

Sy

where Φ = risk aversion parameter, Zα = the standardized normal one-tailed Z value of
an α level of significance, and Sy is the relevant standard deviation under risk neutral
returns. This method will be used to estimate risk aversion coefficients for both E-V and
SDRF. Sy is represented by the standard deviation of the expected price assuming the
producer does not attempt to manage price risk (this expected price will be defined in
detail later in the paper) and Zα will be specified from 5% to 95% in 2.5% increments. In
this formulation, Zα = 50% is considered to be risk neutral while Zα greater than 50% is
risk averse and Zα less than 50% is risk preferring. Some of the extreme values of Zα are
not likely realistic levels of risk preference for agricultural producers but serve to
illustrate how individuals of different levels of risk aversion respond to available choices.
The ranking of the three aforementioned beef cattle marketing strategies will be
completed in the following sections of this paper. First, it will be necessary to specify the
type of beef producer to be analyzed and make any necessary assumptions. Then the
alternatives of no price protection, fairly priced European put options and subsidized
price insurance can be ranked using E-V and SDRF.

After establishing the analytical

procedure of this study, the results of all the analysis will then be reported and discussed
with conclusions following this discussion.
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Analytical Procedure
Assumptions Regarding the Livestock Producer
When examining livestock production it is often necessary to limit the
examination to a specific level of production. This is because different levels of livestock
production may require very different management practices and decision-making
procedures. For example, cow-calf producers must purchase breeding stock and expect
to recover this investment over a period of a few years. Backgrounders, on the other
hand, purchase weaned calves (approximately 500 pounds) and sell them to feedlots a
few months later as feeder cattle (approximately 750 pounds). They are more concerned
about short run prices and conditions than cow-calf producers. For the purposes of this
study, backgrounders will be used.
The assumption will be made that the backgrounder purchases weaned calves and
will sell them in 150 days. Therefore, the producer is concerned with the expected price
of feeder cattle 150 days from the date of purchase. One common method of estimating
this expected price is the feeder cattle futures market contract. Specifically, the price of
the feeder cattle contract that will expire in roughly 150 days will represent the expected
price for a producer with no price protection.

In fulfillment of the goals stated earlier,

this study will approximate the risk associated with this expected price and offer two risk
management strategies to determine producers’ willingness to manage price risk using
fairly priced European put options and subsidized price insurance that is structured as a
European put option.
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Simulation of Expected Prices
Representation of the risk associated with the expected price when no risk
management strategy is used requires further specification of the distribution of possible
prices.

The use of historic prices for this specification would likely complicate this

analysis. There would inevitably be price movements that are specific to the time period
chosen and therefore the volatility of those prices may only be appropriate in the context
of that specific time period.

A more general specification of prices that represents a

realistic level of price volatility circumvents these potential problems.

This specification

can be accomplished based upon the variance and mean of an expected feeder cattle
futures price.
Many consulting services report implied volatilities of futures market contracts.
These are usually calculated using Black’s formula for pricing futures options. A known
premium and strike level are used to solve for the implied volatility.

This measure of

volatility represents the anticipated coefficient of variation of the distribution of possible
prices for a contract.

It is then a matter of simple arithmetic to derive the standard

deviation and variance for the distribution. This study will use $88.50 / cwt the expected
price and 11.0% as the volatility measure (which was the futures price level and implied
volatility for the September feeder cattle futures contract as reported by PM Publishing
Options Analysis in mid April 2001). This results in a standard deviation of $9.74 / cwt
and a variance of 94.77. As stated earlier, normally distributed prices are not commonly
observed. It is more likely that these prices will take on a distribution similar to a gamma
distribution. Based on the first two moments of the distribution (mean and variance), a
cumulative function of the gamma distribution can be fully specified.
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This function can

be inverted such that for a given probability, it returns a number that is expected to occur
at that probability level in the gamma distribution.

By selecting 1000 random

probabilities, ranking them in ascending order, and inserting them into the gamma
distribution one at a time, an accurate representation of the distribution around the
expected price can be obtained. This distribution will represent the marketing alternative
of selling feeder cattle with no means of price protection and will be referred to as NoIns.
Two price risk management strategies will also be proposed.

The first will be

European put options, noted as PRM. These options can be purchased by producers to
establish a price floor and can only be exercised at the time of maturity (i.e.,
approximately the sale date of the feeder cattle). This alternative is simulated based on
the first alternative.

A strike level and price are selected.

This study will use a 95%

strike level, which translates into a $84.07 / cwt strike level or price floor. With the first
distribution ranked in ascending order each observation ni is evaluated. If is it less than
$84.07 / cwt then an indemnity payment (IPi) is added to it so that it equals $84.07 such
that,
(4.6)

IPi = $84.07 - n i , ∀ n i < $84.07 and
IPi = 0 , ∀ n i ≥ $84.07.

As a starting point for the analysis, the option premium will be calculated based on these
actual payments rather than on an option pricing formula.

This premium (PREM) is

calculated as:
(4.7)

PREM f =

1
∑ IPi .
N i

In this formulation PREM is simply the average of all payments. N is the total number of
simulated prices and all other variables maintain their previous definitions.
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This

specification of PREMf ensures that the total of all IPi equals the total of all PREMf, thus
the options are actuarially fair. With the previously specified strike level, PREMf = $2.02
/ cwt. This method of calculating an actuarially fair premium provides a straightforward,
simple analysis of the effects of options and subsidized insurance on risk and has been
used for these reasons in other insurance studies (e.g, Williams et. al). It is also useful to
analyze the options using a theoretically correct premium.
Black offers a method for calculation of a theoretical premium price for futures
options that results in premium that more closely resembles premiums actually paid by
producers.

Harrison uses Black’s premiums in the comparison of purchasing feeder

cattle options to other backgrounding risk management strategies.

Black’s formula is

derived from Black and Schoales formula for pricing stock options and relies mainly on
the volatility (or implied volatility) of futures market prices, risk free interest rates, and
the current price of the futures contract. In the interest of brevity, Black’s formula will
not be reported here. Leuthold, Junkus, and Cordier present a complete explanation of
Black’s formula along with examples.

For the aforementioned example, Black’s

premium (PREMb) will equal $5.16 / cwt. Several examples of actuarially fair premiums
and premiums calculated using Black’s method are presented in Table 4.2 to illustrate the
effects of volatility and interest rates on the cost of price insurance.
At this point the price distribution for PRM can be specified by:
(4.8)

ni + IPi – PREM ∀i,

where PREM = PREM f for an actuarially fair premium and PREM = PREMb for Black’s
theoretical premium.
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The second risk management strategy is a subsidized price risk management
program.

Specifically, this program will represent government subsidized price

insurance and will be referred to as SubPRM. This insurance will maintain the form of
the European put option but producers will receive a subsidy (SUB) from the government
that is a certain percentage of the premium. Thus the distribution for SubPRM becomes
ni + IPi – PREM + SUB*PREM, ∀i,

(4.9)

where PREM can represent either PREM f or PREM b In this study SUB = 50% resulting
in an out-of-pocket expense for SubPRM of $1.01 / cwt when PREM = PREM f and $2.58
for PREM = PREM b. It should be noted that this subsidy level was chosen simply to
illustrate the effects of a government subsidy. Subsidies on crop insurance premiums are
limited to 59% while the Dairy Options Pilot Program subsidizes 80% of dairy option
premiums.

Based on these programs, subsidies on livestock insurance premiums could

fall anywhere in the 59% to 80% range.

The descriptive statistics for all three

alternatives are reported in Table 4.1 and the CDF of each is shown in Figure 1. With the
three choices clearly laid out, it is now possible to simulate producers’ acceptance of the
alternatives by ranking the choices E-V and SD criteria.

Ranking the Risky Alternatives
The ranking of NoIns, PRM, and SubPRM will be accomplished in a two-step
process. First, only the choices of NoIns and PRM will be available to producers. Under
this scenario there are no government incentives that subsidize risk management.

A

producer must choose to be fully exposed to market risk or attempt to manage that risk at
some cost determined by the futures market.
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The second scenario will compare NoIns with SubPRM.
subsidies in place, PRM would still be a feasible alternative.

With government

However, no rational

decision maker would choose PRM. This is because SubPRM dominates PRM under the
E-V framework for all values of Φ, since the variance of prices under each alternative is
the same but the expected price of SubPRM is greater. Furthermore, PRM is dominated
by SubPRM in the sense of FSD. This makes it unnecessary to evaluate the two using
SSD or SDRF since the results will hold (Robison and Barry). In other words, for the
second scenario anyone wishing to manage marketing risk would always choose
SubPRM over PRM and anyone wishing to take on that risk would always choose NoIns,
therefore PRM is never in the risk efficient set.

This procedure will be used first

assuming actuarially fair options and insurance and subsequently assuming Black’s
theoretical premium for each. The results of this ranking are presented and discussed in
the following section.

Results and Discussion
Scenarios 1 and 2 (NoIns vs. PRM and NoIns vs. SubPRM, respectively) were
analyzed using E-V and SDRF. Computer software developed by Cochran and Raskin
was used to rank choices by SDRF. This software has previously been used to rank risky
alternatives relating to both feeder cattle marketing (Harrison et al.) and crop insurance
programs (Williams et al.). Goh et al. offer a complete description of the software.
In scenario 1, under both E-V and SDRF, producers who have any level of risk
aversion will choose PRM when the options are actuarially fair. Risk neutral producers
would be indifferent between NoIns and PRM. However, since the decrease in variance
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comes at no decrease in expected price, it is reasonable to assume that risk neutral
producers would purchase the fairly priced options.

Based on these results, producers

who maximize utility based on income realized at least 50% of the time choose PRM.
This comes as no surprise since the actuarially fair options decrease volatility without
decreasing expected price.

Only risk preferring producers (i.e., Φ < 0) would not

purchase the options since paying a premium eliminates some positive price risk
associated with selling feeder cattle.

When options are priced using Black’s method, a

narrower range of risk attitudes prefer PRM to NoIns. This result is also expected since
Black’s premium decreases the expected price along with volatility.

In this case,

producers evaluate this tradeoff according to their level of risk aversion. The results of
this comparison are reported in Table 4.3. The next step in the analysis is to evaluate the
effects of a government subsidized insurance in the form of European put options.
An anticipated effect of a subsidy on the purchase of insurance is that individuals
who previously received no marginal benefit from the managing the risk of their
respective operations now realize a benefit and therefore purchase insurance. This result
is demonstrated across both methods of risk analysis as well as both methods of option
pricing.

For subsidized insurance based upon actuarially fair options, SDRF indicates

that a greater amount of producers (relative to E-V) who would not choose PRM in
scenario 1 choose SubPRM in the second scenario. This difference in the two techniques
is shown in Table 4.3. These differences are due to the fact that SDRF bases decisions on
the entire distribution of each alternative while E-V relies solely on the first two moments
of the distribution.

SDRF recognizes, to some degree, that primarily downside risk is

being foregone and therefore even individuals with only a slight aversion to risk would be
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better off utilizing PRM.

E-V merely recognizes that the variance has decreased at the

expense of a decreased expected price and judges the tradeoff accordingly with no regard
to the type of risk that has been mitigated. It should be noted that when premiums are
actuarially fair, both E-V and SDRF show that some risk-preferring individuals would
actually purchase the price insurance when premiums are subsidized.

Under both

techniques, these are individuals who prefer more risk to less because they are willing to
weather the volatility of a marketing strategy due to the chance of large payoffs at times.
Relative to actuarially fair premiums, subsidized insurance based upon Black’s
theoretical premiums is not the risk dominant choice for as many risk attitudes. This is to
be expected since Black’s premium offers roughly the same benefit at a higher cost. This
is a useful comparison since Black’s premiums more accurately reflect actual option
premiums faced by producers. Therefore willingness to purchase PRM and SubPRM at
Black’s premium should more accurately describe willingness to buy real world options
and subsidized insurance. As mentioned earlier, it is possible to calculate this willingness
to pay for both PRM and SubPRM.
The E-V approach calculates an individual’s CE (or risk-adjusted returns) for a
given situation.

Given this CE it is possible to approximate the willingness to pay by

producers of different risk attitudes for PRM and SubPRM. It should also be noted that
this willingness to pay assumes that PRM and SubPRM are the only marketing strategies
available to livestock producers and that they are mutually exclusive.

This does not

drastically limit the discussion as this study looks to identify broad trends in the effects of
subsidized livestock price insurance on risk faced by producers.
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Willingness to pay for PRM and SubPRM can be determined by comparing the
CE of NoIns with that of PRM and SubPRM, respectively, assuming that PRM and
SubPRM were free.
(PREM) term.

That is, equations 4.8 and 4.9 were modified to leave out the

The CE of NoIns was then subtracted from each.

The result is the

maximum premium that a person of each risk attitude would forgo to utilize the risk
management strategy.

These measures of willingness to pay are shown in Table 4.4.

Willingness to pay for PRM is the same under actuarially fair premiums and Black’s
premiums. Introducing a subsidy obviously changes the willingness to pay for these risk
management products.

As expected, for both actuarially fair premiums and Black’s

premium, the CE (and therefore willingness to pay) increases by the amount of the
subsidy. Since Black’s premium is larger and the subsidy is based on a percentage of the
premium, willingness to pay for SubPRM is always greater using Black’s premium.
Once the subsidy is introduced, under either premium calculation method, a
producer can now realize the same expected price variance as with PRM but now realize
a higher expected price. This means that SubPRM actually has a lower absolute volatility
(C.V.) than PRM (see Table 4.1). All individuals who did not wish to purchase PRM and
for whom this increase in CE results in a willingness to pay that is greater than PREM
will now purchase SubPRM. It is also true that any individual whose CE is greater than
PREM in scenario 1 would choose to purchase PRM. E-V analysis allows these changes
in willingness to pay to be examined for all levels of risk aversion.
The case of the risk aversion level of 47.5% assuming an actuarially fair premium
provides an interesting example of how the marginal benefit that comes from managing
risk is affected by the subsidy. In scenario 1, an individual with risk preference level of
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47.5% would be willing to pay only $1.36 / cwt for PRM and if forced to pay PREM for
PRM would realize a marginal benefit of -$0.66 / cwt (willingness to pay – PREM).
Under Scenario 2 the same individual is willing to pay PREM for SubPRM and receives
a marginal benefit ($0.35 / cwt) from doing so.

The same scenario exists for the risk

aversion levels of 52.5% to 62.5% assuming Black’s premium.

It is important to note

that no risk-preferring individuals are persuaded by the subsidy to purchase subsidized
insurance under Black’s premium.
In the presence of greater price volatility, risk management results differ from
those reported previously. For example, if a futures price volatility of 18.14% is used to
simulate the marketing alternatives, Black’s premium will be $7.19 (see Table 4.2) the
subsidy will result in risk neutral producers purchasing subsidized insurance.

The

subsidy of $3.60 would be greater than 11.11% volatility since it is based upon a
percentage of the premium. In fact, in this scenario, the expected feeder cattle price with
subsidized insurance is greater than with no price protection and the volatility is lower.
Therefore it is unambiguous that all risk neutral and risk averse producers prefer to
purchase subsidized insurance.

Consequently, this implies that subsidized insurance

dominates no price protection in the sense of SSD. It should be noted that if the subsidy
were increased by at least 10%, E-V results also indicate risk preferring individuals
would actually be persuaded to purchase subsidized insurance that is based upon
theoretically correct options. Furthermore, under an 80% subsidy (the level of the Dairy
Options Pilot Program) some risk preferring individuals (all those with a risk aversion
level of 40% or greater) would purchase subsidized insurance.

Other results from this

level of volatility are not reported but are available upon request from the authors. For
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the riskier situation, the subsidy is greater. This indicates that, as long as the subsidy is
based on a percentage of the premium, producers facing a more volatile expected price
will receive a greater benefit from the subsidy.
These results show, as anticipated, that offering a subsidized insurance product
could very well effect the decision-making process of certain producers, depending upon
their risk attitude. In general the subsidy obviously makes SubPRM more attractive than
PRM to all producers. However, for many producers, the difference is enough to actually
change their optimal risk management strategy from doing nothing to purchasing price
insurance.

Summary and Conclusions
Livestock producers, like all agricultural decision makers, will choose production
and marketing practices that maximize utility.

The feasible production and marketing

practices will generally have some level of uncertainty associated with them.

How an

individual evaluates these feasible alternatives to maximize utility is a function, in part,
of his or her attitude toward risk (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker; Boisvert and McCarl;
Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson; Robison and Barry). This study focused on marketing
risk and basically ignored production risk (and all other sources of risk) during the
analysis. In the case of a backgrounder looking to sell feeder cattle in roughly 5 months,
the marketing risk or uncertainty is the feeder cattle price fluctuation over that 5 months.
In the real world, producers can purchase European options to establish a price floor thus
mitigating the downside feeder cattle price fluctuations.

This study introduced this

marketing alternative (with premiums calculated actuarially and using Black’s method)
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along with the alternative of not managing price risk in Scenario 1. Next, in Scenario 2,
subsidized insurance, in the form of subsidized European options (once again, with
premiums calculated actuarially and using Black’s method) was offered along with the do
nothing strategy as alternatives.

For both scenarios the optimal choice for a variety of

risk aversion levels was chosen using E-V analysis and SDRF.

The differences in the

two scenarios were interesting and highlighted the effects of a subsidy on the risk faced
by livestock producers.
In Scenario 2, when subsidies were based upon actuarially fair premiums, a wider
range risk attitudes, including some risk preferring individuals, found price risk
management appealing.

This was true for both ranking techniques.

E-V results show

that the marginal benefit producers realize from managing price risk is increased by the
amount of the subsidy. This translates into an increased willingness to pay for subsidized
insurance compared to fairly priced options (see Table 4.4). This trend was also observed
in the realistic case involving premiums calculated using Black’s method.

Furthermore,

as feeder cattle price volatility increased, the effects of the subsidy increased in terms of
persuading individuals who previously did not manage risk to do so.

These results

should be of concern to policy makers. If individuals who have an inherent desire to seek
risk (i.e., Φ < 0) now realize a positive marginal benefit from purchasing insurance, it is
conceivable that they will use this benefit to finance operation expansions or new
ventures that require taking on additional risk.

This practice can result in producers

bearing as much or more risk as they did before the subsidy was introduced.
Furthermore, the very presence of this subsidy as rent to be collected by livestock
producers can change the structure of livestock production. If rational decision makers
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realize that this rent is available to them only if they produce livestock, then livestock
production may then become a desirable (possibly optimal) method of earning income. If
producers are attracted only by this rent, they may or may not have the management skills
to run a livestock operation. In these cases subsidies could go to fund livestock price risk
management that is being used in lieu of sound management practices.
These are only some of the possible general effects of subsidized livestock
insurance.

It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to quantify production

responses to subsidized insurance.

However, by using proven and accepted tools for

evaluating risky decision making and by observing past instances in the crop sector, as
this paper has done, it is possible to form hypotheses concerning the possible changes in
beef production brought about by subsidized price insurance.

This study presents two

hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1:

Beef prices could remain at depressed levels for abnormally long time

periods if subsidized price insurance is available to beef producers.
Hypothesis 2:

Some level of beef production would take place that would not exist

without subsidized price insurance for livestock.

Economic theory combined with results of this analysis can be used to justify
these hypotheses. If the additional benefits realized due to the subsidy are used to invest
in increasing feeder cattle production, there are likely to be noticeable changes in beef
cattle production. For example, when market prices for beef are low enough, a decrease
in the quantity of finished cattle (cattle ready for slaughter) occurs.
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This results in a

decreased demand for feeder cattle by feedlots which translates into lower feeder cattle
prices. In this case the backgrounders examined in this study would now be willing to
pay less than before for weaned calves. As a response to this, cow-calf producers are
likely to liquidate herds to some degree and decrease calf production. Unless there is a
change in consumer demand for beef, this decrease in production by the entire sector is
eventually realized at the slaughter level and prices begin to recover. While this cycle is
less defined in recent years, it can still be observed in beef production.
With subsidies on price insurance in place, backgrounders (and other levels of
productions) would now be responding to signals that are based on receiving this subsidy,
in addition to market signals.

They might find that there is no reason to cut back

production so quickly when prices are declining since they are guaranteed the subsidy in
addition to a price floor. If feeder cattle production was kept at higher levels than the
market would normally support there would be more finished cattle and, subsequently,
more beef than the market demands. This excess supply could serve to keep beef prices
and cattle prices at other levels of production low for prolonged periods of time.
Simultaneously, production would be at abnormally high levels.

Furthermore, individual

livestock producers might utilize riskier management and/or production strategies given
their expectations of receiving the subsidy. Taxpayer dollars in the form of subsidies
would be financing livestock production that, otherwise, would not be taking place.
As stated earlier, these hypotheses cannot be tested as of yet. However, the tools
used to identify and explain the general trends in supply response are well established and
accepted methods of analyzing risk. Given this and that the hypotheses drawn here can
be rationalized using basic economic theory, they warrant a reasonable level of
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consideration. The results of this study and the hypotheses offered in this section should
serve to give some perspective to the structuring of these livestock insurance policies and
provide a focus for future research in this subject area.
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Three Price Distributions of Feeder Cattle
Marketing Alternatives
Mean
($ / cwt)

Standard Deviation
($ / cwt)

C.V.
(%)

No Price Risk
Management

88.50

9.843

11.11

Actuarially Fair
European Put Options

88.50

7.396

8.38

Subsidized Insurance Based on
Actuarially Fair Premiums1

89.51

7.396

8.26

European Put Options
Priced via Black’s Method2

85.29

7.396

8.67

Subsidized Insurance Based on
Black’s Premiums1,2

87.90

7.396

8.41

1. The subsidy equals 50% of the option premium.
2. Premiums were calculated Black’s formula for theoretical futures option premiums assuming a current
futures price of $88.50, 11.11% volatility, 4 % risk free interest rate, and 150 days to maturity.
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Table 4.2. Actuarially Fair Premiums and Black’s Theoretical Premiums for
European Put Options for Feeder Cattle
Risk Free
Volatility
Actuarially Fair
Black’s Theoretical
Interest Rate
of Futures Prices
Premium
Premium
(%)
(%)
($ / cwt)
($ / cwt)
4.0

11.11
15.14
18.17

2.02
3.31
4.29

5.23
6.40
7.19

6.0

11.11
15.14
18.17

2.02
3.31
4.29

5.16
6.33
7.11

8.0

11.11
15.14
18.17

2.02
3.31
4.29

5.09
6.25
7.03

Note: Current futures price is assumed to be $88.50 per cwt. The strike price is $84.07 / cwt and the
option is assumed to expire in 150 days.
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Table 4.3. Ranges of Risk Aversion Levels for Which Each Marketing Alternative is
Preferred to No Price Risk Management Under Expected Value Variance (E-V) or
Stochastic Dominance (SDRF) Analysis
Range of Risk
Range of Risk
1
Aversion Levels
Aversion Coefficients1
Actuarially Fair
European Put Options
E-V
SDRF

50.0% and greater
50.0% and greater

0.0 and greater
0.0 and greater

Subsidized Insurance Based on
Actuarially Fair Premiums
E-V
SDRF

47.5% and greater
40.0% and greater

-0.01780 and greater
-0.05145 and greater

European Put Options
Priced via Black’s Method2
E-V
SDRF

65.0% and greater
72.5% and greater

0.07830 and greater
0.12202 and greater

Subsidized Insurance Based on
Black’s Premiums2
E-V
SDRF

52.5% and greater
55.0% and greater

0.01780 and greater
0.02562 and greater

1. Risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler. A brief
explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper. See McCarl and
Bessler for a detailed presentation.
2. Premiums were calculated Black’s formula for theoretical futures option premiums assuming a current
futures price of $88.50, 11.11% volatility, 4.0 % risk free interest rate, and 150 days to maturity.
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Table 4.4. Willingness to Pay for European Put Options
Risk Aversion
Level1

Risk Aversion
Coefficient 1

European Put Options
($ / cwt)

5%
30%
40%
42.5%
45%
47.5%
50%
52.5%
55%
57.5
60%
62.5%
65%
67.5
70%
72.5%
75%
77.5%
87.5%
95%

-0.33455
-0.10657
-0.05145
-0.03864
-0.02562
-0.01780
0.0
0.01780
0.02562
0.03864
0.05145
0.06508
0.07830
0.09231
0.10657
0.12202
0.13728
0.15361
0.23388
0.33455

-12.03
-2.46
-0.14
0.40
0.95
1.27
2.02
2.77
3.10
3.65
4.18
4.76
5.31
5.90
6.50
7.15
7.79
8.48
11.85
16.08

1. Risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler. A brief
explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper. See McCarl and
Bessler for a detailed presentation.
Note: Willingness to pay represents the amount that the risk-adjusted return per cwt is changed when
European put options are purchased. To determine whether a decision maker of a given risk aversion level
would purchase these options or subsidized insurance this willingness to pay can be compared to $2.02,
$1.01, $5.23, and $2.62 for actuarially fair premiums, subsidized actuarially fair insurance, options priced
via Black’s method, and subsidized Black’s premium. Black’s formula assumed 11.11% volatility, 4.0%
risk free interest rate, and 150 days to maturity. In all cases the subsidy used was equal to 50% of the
relevant premium.
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Figure 4.1.
Alternatives

Cumulative Distribution Functions of Feeder Cattle Marketing
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Note: The distribution of No Price Protection is based on an expected price of $88.50 / cwt with a volatility
of 11.11% distributions of Fully Priced Options and Subsidized Insurance are based on actuarially fair
premiums and a 50% subsidy of that premium, respectively.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

Summary of Risk Analyses
Beef producers, like all farmers, must make decisions such as input selection and
how to market output in an uncertain environment.

Backgrounders in particular must

purchase feed ingredients and weaned calves with the intention of feeding the calves and
selling them as feeder cattle in a few months. The net income risk of a backgrounding
operation is drastically influenced by the risks surrounding the purchase of feed
ingredients and the sale of feeder cattle. Backgrounders who are risk averse would prefer
to forgo some amount of expected net income to realize a more predictable net income.
The amount of net income that a producer will forgo in exchange for a decrease in
volatility of net income is dependent upon his or her level of risk aversion.

While

strategies exist for risk averse producers to manage net income risk, there are other
potentially effective strategies that have gone relatively unexplored.
introduced and evaluated two such novel risk management strategies.

This study
These strategies

are aimed at managing net income risk by managing risks associated with purchasing
feed ingredients and selling feeder cattle, respectively.

A summary of the analysis

regarding each of these strategies follows.

Summary of Optimal Feed Ration Determination
Given the impact of feed cost on total livestock production expense the
determination of a feed ration warrants careful consideration by livestock producers. A
common approach to this determination is identifying the minimum cost combination of
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available feed ingredients that satisfy nutritional requirements using linear programming.
Linear programming models that select minimum cost feed rations have had a
pronounced presence in academic research and are prevalent as applied decision tools.
Although useful, these models have generally ignored the risks associated with
purchasing feed ingredients, of which feed ingredient nutrient variability and price risk
are the most critical.

Therefore, it is worthwhile to expand the traditional model to

choose optimal rations considering variability in the nutritional compositions and price
variability of feed ingredients.
The traditional model was expanded in Chapter III to consider nutrient variability
and price risk.

This expansion included introducing a Merrill’s technique for modeling

technical coefficient uncertainty and an E-V framework to consider objective function
risk.

There were both methodological and applied contributions to agricultural economic

research resulting from this expansion.
Chapter III contributed to the mathematical programming literature by explicitly
modeling the problematic issue of technical coefficient risk using Merrill’s approach.
Due to limitations of computational solvers, Merrill’s approach is absent from the
literature with the exception of one study in which Wicks and Guise utilized a linear
approximation of the technique.

Given the advancement of computational solvers for

optimization and the recent availability of reliable feed ingredient nutrient variability
data, this study was able to model Merrill’s approach directly.
A contribution to applied livestock economic literature was the demonstration that
minimum cost feed rations are not optimal to all producers.

This implies that if a risk

averse producer chooses rations using traditional linear programming decision aids, he or
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she is exposed to more risk than would be preferred.

The expanded model allows

decision makers to select rations that are optimal subject to their aversion to nutrient
variability and/or price risk.

Model results indicate that, in many cases, producers

wishing to control the variability of nutrients in the ration need only to increase the
amounts of the optimal ingredients.

The magnitude of this increase will vary depending

on which ingredients are in the optimal ration with no consideration given to risk.
Controlling price risk usually requires bringing new ingredients into the optimal ration or
changing the relative amounts of the ingredients in the base ration.

Managing the two

types of risk simultaneously requires more complex combinations of the two strategies
listed above. These results and basic methods of managing nutrient and price risks could
be the basis for more advanced decision tools.

These decision tools can present

alternative rations in the form of a set of risk efficient choices as was done in this study.
Decision makers can then weigh the costs and benefits of all feasible alternatives and
then formulate rations that are optimal given their individual attitude toward risk.

Summary of Subsidized Livestock Insurance Analysis Summary
Chapter IV focused on marketing risk of a backgrounder who anticipates selling
of feeder cattle five months in the future. This marketing risk is the feeder cattle price
fluctuation over that five months. Producers can currently purchase European options to
establish a price floor thus mitigating the impact of downside feeder cattle price
fluctuations.

This study compared this marketing alternative (with premiums calculated

actuarially and using Black’s method) to the alternative of not managing price risk. Next,
subsidized insurance, in the form of subsidized European options (once again, with
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premiums calculated actuarially and using Black’s method) was compared to the do
nothing strategy. In both comparisons, the optimal choice for a variety of risk aversion
levels was chosen using E-V analysis and SDRF.
When subsidized insurance was based upon actuarially fair premiums, a wider
range of risk attitudes, including risk preferring individuals, found price risk management
appealing. This was true for both ranking techniques. When premiums were calculated
using Black’s method fewer individuals found price risk management appealing, relative
to actuarially fair premiums, and no risk-preferring individuals were compelled to
purchase insurance at a 50% subsidy. However, as either volatility of feeder cattle prices
or subsidy level increased, risk preferring individuals were indeed persuaded to purchase
insurance under Black’s premiums. It is evident how these results could be of concern to
policy makers.
If individuals who have an inherent desire to seek risk now realize a positive
marginal benefit from purchasing insurance, it is conceivable that they will use this as
means to finance the taking on of additional risk. This practice can result in producers
bearing as much or more risk as they did before the subsidy was introduced.
Furthermore, the very presence of this subsidy as rent to be collected by livestock
producers can change the structure of livestock production.

If rational decision makers

realize that this rent is available to them only if they produce livestock, then livestock
production may then become a desirable (possibly optimal) method of earning income. If
producers are attracted only by this rent, they may or may not have the management skills
to run a livestock operation. In these cases subsidies could go to fund livestock price risk
management that is being used in lieu of sound management practices.
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Chapter IV evaluated these results to form two hypotheses of the potential effects
of subsidized livestock insurance on beef production. These are:

Hypothesis 1:

Beef prices could remain at depressed levels for abnormally long time

periods if subsidized price insurance is available to beef producers.
Hypothesis 2: Some level of beef production will take place that would not exist without
subsidized price insurance for livestock.

While not testable at this point, the hypotheses drawn here can be rationalized
using basic economic theory. Therefore, they warrant a reasonable level of consideration
in the structuring of livestock insurance products as well as future livestock economic
research. Hopefully the results and the hypotheses offered in Chapter IV will encourage
policy makers to consider the incentives that subsidized livestock insurance actually
introduces to producers and subsequently look to introduce appropriate incentives.

Risk Management Contributions
As previously stated, the general objective of this study was to introduce and
evaluate novel risk management strategies for beef producers. While risk management in
agriculture has been a widely researched area, the strategies presented in this study have
gone largely unexplored. There have been various reasons, as discussed throughout this
study, for the absence of the analysis of these strategies. However, at this juncture it is
entirely feasible and worthwhile to examine the risk management potential of selecting
optimal feed rations (as opposed to strictly minimum cost feed rations) and subsidized
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livestock insurance. The analysis of each strategy in this study can serve to focus future
research in livestock risk management.
The model for selecting optimal feed rations can be applied to other types of
livestock producers such as dairies or feedlots. The model in Chapter III can be readily
changed to formulate rations for any group of animals for which nutrient requirements
are known.
data.

However specification of such models may be limited by feed ingredient

The nutrient variability data in Chapter III represents perhaps the best available

data of that type. It is often difficult to obtain such data for certain feed ingredient or for
specific states or regions of the country.
While basic in terms of the methods and data used, the analysis of subsidized
insurance should offer some perspective of how useful this will be as a risk management
tool.

This aspect of the analysis will soon be of interest to livestock producers as

livestock insurance products become available.

Regardless of the form these products

take, the analytical framework in Chapter IV will be applicable to their comparison with
each other and other risk management strategies. Furthermore, the analysis of subsidized
livestock insurance highlights policy concerns of making such a risk management tool
available to producers.

Specifically, the results show that such products can easily

introduce unintentional incentives to producers.

Chapter IV should serve as a basic

example of the effects of risk management and its subsidization that can be modified to
examine these issues in almost any context.
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Conclusions
Given the importance of beef to the United States’ agricultural economy and the
trend of a decreasing government role in agricultural risk management, a major role of
livestock economists is to evaluate possible alternatives for improving beef producers’
ability to manage risk.

This study has performed this evaluation for two such

alternatives, minimum cost feed ration selection and subsidized livestock insurance, as
they apply to a beef backgrounder. Certain results of this study are useful only to beef
backgrounders.

However, some results have a much broader application.

Feed

manufacturers may also have a desire to purchase ingredients that result in a more
predictable nutrient composition.

Agricultural lenders would benefit from knowing the

effectiveness of livestock insurance as a risk management tool, as they evaluate livestock
producers’ qualifications for credit. In addition to these applied uses of the results, the
analytical frameworks and overall conclusions can benefit a broad range of individuals.
Successful introduction of Merrill’s technique into a mathematical programming
model paves the way for expanded research into the effects of technical coefficient risk.
Applying widely accepting methods to the evaluation of subsidized livestock insurance
offers a basic framework for analyzing price variability and the effects of a government
subsidy that is widely applicable.

In general, the results discussed and conclusions

offered by this study coupled with the questions raised by it should serve to improve the
agricultural producers’ understanding of risk in agricultural decision making.
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